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I. DOCTRINAL OPENNESS AND FUNCTIONAL PRIVATIZATION
The topic of this symposium, Secrecy, suggests a focus on
affirmative decisions shutting out the public by sealing records and
closing courtrooms. My interest, in contrast, is in a broader set of
processes that makes dispute resolution inaccessible and, in that
sense, secret. My focus is on the problem of institutional privatization,
as contrasted with questions of individuals’ personal privacy. The
kind of secrecy I discuss here has several sources including the
promotion of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) through inchambers judicial management and settlement efforts; the design of
some online dispute resolution (“ODR”) and court-annexed
arbitration programs; mandates to outsource dispute resolution to
private providers; bans on pursuing relief through class actions; and
the costs to individuals of pursuing claims.1
Rather than any “natural” states of open or closed dispute
resolution, political and social movements shape laws endowing
courts, ADR, ODR, and arbitration with their attributes. Today, we
assume courts to be open and think of judicial management and of
arbitration as closed. These assumptions are the product of rules,
doctrine, and practices that are in motion. As I detail below, much of
what takes place in courts increasingly happens outside the public
purview, and yet some judges do pre-trial work in open court, on the
bench and on the record.2 Likewise, while privately provided
1. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2807–09 (2015)
[hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]; Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in
Courts: Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15
NEV. L.J. 1631, 1636–37 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in
Courts].
2. See Steven G. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 U. KAN.
L. REV. 849, 861–62 (2013). The Honorable Judge David Campbell of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Arizona, described doing pretrial conferences on the record and
typically on the bench. See Judge David Campbell, Chairman, Advisory Comm. on the
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arbitrations are generally cloistered, some jurisdictions permit public
access to court-annexed arbitration.3
A distinction therefore needs to be drawn between what I call
the doctrinal openness of courts, familiar because of layers of custom,
practice, rules, and law formally committed to public access, and the
functional privatization of court-based activities and of some forms of
arbitration that make interactions and outcomes inaccessible. The
entrenchment of new rules of privatization reflect what Marc
Galanter described as the ability of “repeat players” (the “haves” in
his classic article) to come out “ahead” by using their resources and
knowledge to structure procedures benefitting their interests rather
than those of “one-shot” players.4 Even as game metaphors give me
pause given the impact that law has on our lives, Galanter’s analysis
locates how reiterative involvement provides insights into, and the
potential for authority over, the procedures that have substantive
impacts on rights and remedies.
Repeat players (such as governments, businesses, and lawyers
regularly in court) have by definition a visibility that one-shot players
lack. It may, therefore, be surprising to learn that federal and state
courts are filled with one-shot participants, appearing without lawyers
to represent them. Between 2005 and 2016, unrepresented litigants
filed about a quarter or more of the civil claims filed in federal
courts.5 More than half of appeals in federal courts are pursued by

Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Address at the Univ. of Ariz. James E. Rodgers Coll. of
Law Civil Procedure Workshop (Oct. 5, 2017).
3. Illinois is one example; its thousands of court-annexed arbitrations take place in
courts or arbitration centers open to the public. See infra notes 19, 155–58, and
accompanying text.
4. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–103 (1974); Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M.
Kritzer & Stewart Macaulay, Do the “Haves” Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 803 (1999). Galanter’s analysis focused on courts and did not compare the impact of
repeat playing and resources in obtaining or structuring the rules for other services, such
as health care. See Richard Lempert, A Classic at 25: Reflections of Galanter’s “Haves”
Article and Work It Has Inspired, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1099, 1108 (1999).
5. The term used in the federal data collection is pro se. See U.S. COURTS, CIVIL
PRO SE AND NON-PRO SE FILINGS, BY DISTRICT, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD
ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 [hereinafter 2016 U.S. DISTRICT COURT PRO SE FILINGS],
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c13_0930.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9AAL-EGHM]. The federal court database details all pro se filings since 2005. See U.S.
COURTS, CIVIL PRO SE AND NON-PRO SE FILINGS (2005–2010) [hereinafter 2005–2010
U.S. DISTRICT COURT PRO SE FILINGS], http://www.uscourts.gov/report-names/judicialbusiness?tn=c-13&pt=All&t=All&m%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=&y%5Bvalue%5D
%5Byear%5D= [https://perma.cc/NES9-E9W3].
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individuals lacking lawyers.6 Studies of state courts identify higher
percentages of lawyer-less litigants. The National Center for State
Courts (“NCSC”) sampled cases in ten major counties and, in about
three quarters of some 650,000 cases analyzed, at least one side was
not represented by an attorney.7
Lawyers are the proverbial repeat players, and one way to bring
lawyers into cases is through government funding for those who
cannot afford them. Congress did so in 1974, when it created the
Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”).8 But during the subsequent
decades, Congress provided budget allocations insufficient to meet
the demand for these legal services.9 In 2016, the LSC reported that
individuals eligible for its services regularly “received inadequate or
no legal help.”10
Another major infusion of lawyering resources comes from class
actions. Aggregation responds to the problem that some claims have
what economists call “negative value,” meaning that the expenses of
recovery are larger than the direct loss incurred. As Benjamin Kaplan,
the principal drafter of the 1966 revision to the federal class action
rule put it, group-based litigation enabled individuals, lacking
“effective strength” individually to pursue their claims, to join
together and seek redress.11 Repeat players also saw the value in

6. U.S. COURTS, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS—PRO SE CASES COMMENCED AND
TERMINATED, BY CIRCUIT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING, DURING THE 12-MONTH
PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2016 [hereinafter U.S. APPELLATE COURT PRO SE
FILINGS],
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_b9_0930.2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V4T3-DBMA].
7. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN
STATE COURTS 31–32 (2015) [hereinafter LANDSCAPE CIVIL LITIGATION STATE
COURTS 2015], https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Research/CivilJusticeReport2015.ashx [https://perma.cc/4RSJ-MDUW].
8. History, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/who-we-are/history
[https://perma.cc/U4G5-R4EG].
9. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., REPORT OF THE PRO BONO TASK FORCE 1–2 (2012),
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/attach/2015/09/Report-ProBonoTaskForce-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XZ4G-2HNT]. As the LSC reported, “at least 50% of people seeking
help from LSC-funded organizations—and eligible to receive it—are turned away because
of insufficient resources.” Id.
10. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL
LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default
/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3FZ-KUHK].
11. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497
(1969). I provide some of the history of the drafting of the 1966 revisions to Rule 23 in
Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due: Using Jurisdiction to Forge Post-Settlement
Relationships Among Litigants, Courts, and the Public in Class and Other Aggregate
Litigation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1017, 1019–31 (2017) [hereinafter Resnik, Reorienting the
Process Due] and Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for
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aggregation because grouping claims together offered economies of
scale and the possibility of obtaining closure about their liabilities.12
But federal legislation and recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court have erected barriers to the use of collective actions. As of
1996, LSC lawyers cannot bring class actions.13 As of 2011, federal
and state courts must enforce class-action bans that manufacturers,
employers, and service providers impose on their less well-resourced
counterparts, consumers, and employees.14 These clauses (inserted in
job applications and consumer product information) typically
mandate that if disputes arise, claimants may not pursue their rights
in courts but can only proceed, single-file, in dispute resolution
systems designated by employers or manufacturers. Arbitration
clauses sometimes also permit consumers and employees to use small
claims courts, again without collective actions.15
Resource asymmetries among classes of litigants are therefore
central to discussions of how functional privatization has become so
salient a feature of dispute resolution in the United States.
Proponents of class action bans understand that group-based
proceedings—whether in courts or in arbitration—are engines of
publicity. The number of people involved undermines the capacity to
keep private the allegations of misbehavior and the decisions reached
about their legality.16 Moreover, as I detail below, the insertion of
mandates to arbitrate in employee and consumer documents has not
resulted in a mass of arbitrations. Rather, amidst tens of millions of
consumers and employees, almost none file arbitration claims. And if

Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLS in the Federal Courts,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1788–95 (2017) [hereinafter Resnik, “Vital” State Interests].
12. Resnik, “Vital” State Interests, supra note 11, at 1778–80, 1788–96.
13. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-134, § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–53 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1617.3 (2017));
see also Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics Beyond the Vanishing Trial: Unrepresented
Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1921–22 (2017) [hereinafter Resnik, Beyond the Vanishing Trial].
14. I analyze the development of the law on such bans in Resnik, Diffusing Disputes,
supra note 1, at 2863–74. See also MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–40, 130–35 (2013); Robin
Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis 66–
69 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 18-12, 2017).
15. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A), at 15–17 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION
STUDY], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress
-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/32YD-S2JB].
16. This suppression of claims is one factor in the flattening filings in both state and
federal courts. See Resnik, Beyond the Vanishing Trial, supra note 13, at 1902–21.
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they do, they are often subjected to confidentiality clauses directing
them not to discuss either processes or outcomes.
Repeat players have thus largely succeeded in persuading courts
to approve confidentiality clauses even as judges acknowledge the
advantages derived from one side knowing the track record of past
proceedings, while individual opponents do not.17 The silencing of
opponents, coupled with the relocation of dispute resolution to
private providers that have no commitments to open access, has
reoriented dispute resolution. The norms that undergird the various
new rules diffuse and privatize process; in practice, the result is often
cutting off the ability to bring claims in any forum.18
In the title of this Article, I use “A2J,” because it (or “ATJ”) is
the shorthand for state and federal task forces aiming to improve
“access to justice.”19 These projects are largely focused on enabling
17. See, e.g., Guyden v. Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 384–85 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding
enforceable arbitration mandates imposed by an employer despite recognizing that “in the
context of individual statutory claims, a lack of public disclosure may systematically favor
companies over individuals” (quoting Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477
(D.C. Cir. 1997))); Iberia Credit Bureau Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175
(5th Cir. 2004) (“While the confidentiality requirement is probably more favorable to the
cellular provider than to its customer, the plaintiffs have not persuaded us that the
requirement is so offensive as to be invalid.”); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc.,
368 F.3d 269, 279–81 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding no unfairness in employee confidentiality
clause because “[e]ach side has the same rights and restraints . . . and there is nothing
inherent in confidentiality itself that favors or burdens one party . . . in the dispute
resolution process”).
18. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2852–54. Efforts to stop the use of
collective actions in Europe are likewise underway through efforts of the Institute for
Legal Reform (“ILR”), related to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, as illustrated by its
monographs emphasizing the “risks” of collective redress. See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, THE GROWTH OF COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN THE EU: A SURVEY OF
DEVELOPMENTS IN 10 MEMBER STATES 1 (2017), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com
/uploads/sites/1/The_Growth_of_Collective_Redress_in_the_EU_A_Survey_of_Developments
_in_10_Member_States_April_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YMQ-WSZ3]. The Chamber
calls for “safeguards.” U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, SUPPORTING
SAFEGUARDS: EU CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARDS COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AND
LITIGATION FUNDING 1 (2017), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1
/EU_Paper_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6QY-EB4M].
19. See Access to Justice Commissions, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org
/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/resource_center_for_access_to_justice/at
j-commissions.html [https://perma.cc/5UQ3-54L5]; Office for Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atj [https://perma.cc/7AH8-PQSG]. Several states
have established access to justice commissions. See, e.g., STATUTORY COURT FEE TASK
FORCE, ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
ADDRESSING BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED
WITH FEES AND OTHER COURT COSTS IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL, AND TRAFFIC
PROCEEDINGS 1 (2016), www.illinoiscourts.gov/2016_Statutory_Court_Fee_Task_Force
_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9GX-TS24] [hereinafter ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS
2016]; CONN. JUDICIAL BRANCH ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
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claimants to come to court or otherwise obtain assistance related to
legal claims. These task forces have done essential work in clarifying
the need for legal advice, in detailing the layers of court assessments
that limit access, and in seeking to build coalitions among repeat and
one-shot players. But these task forces have not often focused on how
to shore up the public dimension of the disputing that is done in
courts as well as in courts’ alternatives.
I link “A2J” to “A2K”—“access to knowledge”—to underscore
the interdependencies of the two. Not only does the act of rendering
judgments require knowledge, but assessing the justice of those
judgments also requires that third parties be able to understand
particular cases, watch interactions, and know the systems in which
individual judgments are made. Access-to-justice initiatives therefore
need to become yet more ambitious by going beyond helping people
find more “paths” to obtain redress and persuading legislatures to
fund lawyers and courts to reduce the burdens on individuals.20 To
turn access into justice, the agendas of A2J have to include generating
practices and constitutional doctrine insistent on making dispute
resolution processes and outcomes open to the public.
Without public access, one cannot know whether fair treatment
is accorded regardless of litigants’ status. Without public
participation, no one can see how norms of equal treatment can be
turned into dignified interactions among litigants and decisionmakers. Without oversight, one cannot ensure that judges are
independent of parties. Without independent judges acting in public
and treating disputants in an equal and dignified manner, outcomes
lose their claim to legitimacy. And without public accountings of how
legal norms are being applied, one cannot consider the need for
revisions of underlying rules, remedies, and procedures by which to
decide claims of right. We lose the very capacity to debate what our
forms and norms of fairness are.
Courts and arbitration are creatures of our own making,
refashioned regularly through politics producing legal change. By
toggling back and forth in this Article between court-based
adjudication, arbitration, and other forms of ADR, I show the degree
to which the processes interact, how practices, regulations, and
constitutional doctrine shape—and reshape—the normative
expectations of each, and why a retrieval of public processes,
1 (2012), https://www.jud.ct.gov/committees/access/ATJ_AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc
/KZV4-R28Z]; In re Okla. Access to Justice Comm’n, 2014 OK 16, __ P.3d __ (mem.).
20. See HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT
GOING TO LAW 249–64 (1999).
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consistent with protection of individuals’ privacy, is imperative for the
body politic.
A roadmap to what follows is in order. In Part II, I address a
predicate question: why, in a world replete with information sources,
does it matter if people can go to court and use dispute resolution
processes accessible to the public? After exploring the normative
values at stake, I reflect in Part III on why we understand ourselves to
be entitled—as a matter of “right”—to have courts be public and
open venues. I then turn to an array of practices in courts and
arbitration that diminish the occasions on which the public has
anything to watch.
In Part IV, I discuss how the closing off of ADR and ODR
interact with bans on class actions, confidentiality clauses, and a host
of “legal financial obligations” (“LFOs”), all of which make dispute
resolution inaccessible and aspects of it secret. Part IV also shows
some of the impact. I add to the documentation on the use of
arbitration by mining publicly available databases that reflect how
unusual single-file consumer claims are. To the extent ODR creates
new routes to redress, the versions practiced in the United States
have not built in third-party access to welcome observers or to enable
assessment of its processes or outcomes. The pressures on courts to
finance their own services are another way in which access is limited;
a host of assessments deter litigants from using courts. Filing suit also
imposes costs on opponents. Defendants in both criminal and civil
proceedings are often put at risk of incurring financial obligations that
make those with resources complain of a need to capitulate, especially
if faced with class action plaintiffs. For less well resourced defendants,
lawsuits can put them into cycles of debt or pressure them into
defaulting even when they have potential defenses to assert.21
Part V turns to the need to reframe constitutional doctrine so as
to constrain the functional privatization of dispute resolution. Current
approaches rely on the tradition of access to trials as the benchmark.
Given the rarity of trials, preserving public practices requires revising
the legal inquiries to focus on the utilities of open dispute resolution
as it now takes place, whether in person or through exchanges of
materials online.
I close in Part VI with the reminder that making courts accessible
is in the interests of individual and repeat players. In the nineteenth

21. See Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed
by Debt Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179, 208–14, 223–32 (2014); infra notes 261–
74.
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century, creditors pressed for constitutional protection of open courts
and rights to remedies to ease pursuit of debtors. In the twentieth
century, banks saw collective actions as useful when marketing new
economic products because aggregation enabled limiting repetitive
disputes about the propriety of investment decisions.22 Governments
likewise depend on courts to validate their authority and to enforce
their norms.
Reminders of the utilities of public court procedures in the
twenty-first century come from “#MeToo”—an explosion of claims in
the fall of 2017 in which individuals described their experiences of
having been sexually harassed and of having been silenced out of fear
of retribution or by virtue of settlements that mandated
confidentiality.23 The reiterative cri de coeur is for accountability,
which reflects how, in the past, the results of investigations into
misbehavior have often been closed off.
Evidence that these remarkable public declarations about sexual
predatory behavior could show repeat players the importance of
public processes is emerging. Members of Congress have proposed
legislation to protect access to court-based remedies for employees
alleging sexual harassment; the bill would exempt them from being
routed exclusively to arbitration, with its connotations of closed
proceedings.24 What the #MeToo movement has already exemplified
is that a myriad of barriers make it difficult to bring claims against
more powerful opponents and that, if claims are pursued, secrecy has
often been part of the price of the resolution. The outpouring of
stories shows that secrecy has its costs, both for third parties who
might not have been in harm’s way and for those directly involved.
#MeToo also exemplifies the ways in which the dissemination of
information without the constraints of legal process makes it hard to
sort among different kinds of harms, to probe the accuracy of
information, and to calibrate sanctions. This rebellion against secrecy
22. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307–08 (1950); infra
notes 317–26 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Samantha Schmidt, #MeToo: Harvey Weinstein Case Moves Thousands
to Tell Their Own Stories of Abuse, Break Silence, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/10/16/me-too-alyssa-milanourged-assault-victims-to-tweet-in-solidarity-the-response-was-massive/ [https://perma.cc
/3AWS-5Z83].
24. Parallel bills were introduced in December of 2017 in the U.S. House of
Representatives and in the Senate. See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment
Claims, H.R. 4570, 115th Cong. (2017); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment
Claims, S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017). As discussed in Parts I and VI, arbitration is not
intrinsically closed, and Congress and the courts can also bound the authority to impose
blanket closures.
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should therefore serve as a reminder of what public processes can
offer: deliberate decision-making that insists on due process norms of
even-handedness, screens information for reliability, and requires
analysis of liability and remedies appropriate to the misconduct, when
established.
The question that becomes vivid by mixing this recent blast of
publicity with the expanding modes of privatization is whether public
performance of the power to resolve disputes remains central to
legitimating authority. My worry is that providers of both public and
private dispute resolution seem not to believe in the need to
demonstrate the propriety of their exercise of authority. To stem
“secrecy in courts” requires finding ways to generate, anew,
commitments that the power to issue binding decisions about legal
misbehavior depends on welcoming the public as central participants
in the processes of judgment.
II. THE NORMATIVE IMPORT OF OPEN COURTS IN DEMOCRACIES
“Open courts” is a phrase that references both the ability of third
parties to watch proceedings and the ability of disputants to bring
claims. As to the first sense of openness, a predicate question is
whether claims for open courts are passé, in that many other
institutions and technologies disseminate information about conflicts.
As #MeToo makes plain, examples in this digital age are easy to
provide. Another was when, in the spring of 2017, a video of airline
employees dragging a seated, ticketed passenger from an airplane
went “viral”25—a word apt to capture how information spread.
In addition to new technologies and more outlets, the
relationship of the body politic to information has changed. The legal
regime spawned by the New Deal and reflected in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is credited to progressives, confident that the
production of information would bring clarity about facts, obligations,
outcomes, and justice. Not only are we now subject to informationoverload; we also live in a world of fact skeptics, “alternative fact”
promoters, propaganda, and disinformation. The misuse of
information is not novel, but the techniques for dissemination are,
making plain that information per se is not an unvarnished public

25. Avi Selk & Lori Aratani, United Airlines CEO Apologizes for ‘Horrific Event,’
Promises Review of Policies After Passenger Violently Deplaned, WASH. POST (Apr. 11,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2017/04/11/amid-pr-fiascoover-dragged-passenger-united-ceo-defends-his-crew/ [https://perma.cc/BW3G-KL8U].
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good. More than that, hackers and trollers abound, and revelations
can unfairly subject individuals to harm.
Yet it is precisely this plethora of information that makes courtbased production of knowledge (as contrasted to information)
attractive. Once in the realm of adjudication, the modes of discourse
are forced to change. A myriad of rules imposes codes of conduct for
exchanges on paper and in person. Even as critics argue the decline of
civility in the legal profession, court rules exclude “impertinent, or
scandalous matter.”26 Parties are obliged to put forth specifics (often
boringly repeated), and constitutional doctrine mandates that judges
“hear the other side.”27 Further, eliciting competing accounts of what
has transpired is built into the process. The relatively extravagant
investment of resources (both public and private) in each case
produces accounts of events linked to legal rights and obligations.
When judges do make decisions on the bench or in writing, they
are locked into relying on records and into weighing the legal import
of facts. Although a few jurists are known for writing sentences
providing sound bites for the media,28 judges are more often criticized
for being hard to understand. In the last decades, courts have made
efforts at translation, in part through hiring public information
officers (organized enough so as to have their own acronym, “PIOs”),
who send out press releases to explain the content of decisions.29 In
short, even given a world replete with multiple sources of
information, courts are distinctive in producing a unique form of
knowledge. Newspapers may cut fact-checking staff,30 but courts
cannot.
A. Understanding the Function of the Public
What are the utilities and the politics of this form of knowledge
production and its relationship to justice? The classic arguments for
openness in courts date from the nineteenth century when Jeremy
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f).
27. See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION,
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 288–
305 (2011) [hereinafter RESNIK & CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE].
28. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827–28 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Roberts, C.J., Thomas & Alito, JJ.) (“[The majority’s opinion] will almost
certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”).
29. See Welcome from the President, CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS,
https://www.ccpio.org/about/welcome/ [https://perma.cc/G73N-VR5K].
30. See Sydney Ember, Times Staff Members Protest Cuts and Changes to News
Operation, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/business
/media/new-york-times-staff-members-protest-cuts.html [https://perma.cc/7HYM-VQDZ
(dark archive)].
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Bentham offered a fierce defense for what he termed “publicity,” an
attribute he advocated for all facets of government.31 For Bentham,
publicity made several contributions. A first was truth; he thought
that public access to witness testimony would serve as “a check upon
mendacity and incorrectness”—that public disclosures would make it
easier to identify false statements.32
Another was education, in that judges would want to explain
their actions to those watching them.33 Courts were therefore both
“schools” and “theatres of justice.”34 And famously, Bentham lauded
publicity’s disciplinary powers: “the more strictly we are watched, the
better we behave.”35
The desired end point for Bentham was to enable the public to
function as a “half real and half imaginary” Tribunal of Public
Opinion able to know the process of decision-making and the bases
for the outcomes and, therefore to assess whether the rules
comported with its interests.36 Bentham’s interest in making elites
accountable37 relied on what Robert Post recently termed a
populace’s “democratic competency,” stemming from “access to
disciplinary knowledge.”38 Post argued that the need for this form of
literacy explained commitments to free speech and a free press.39 His

31. “Without publicity all other checks are insufficient: in comparison with publicity,
all other checks are of small account.” JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE: SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE (1827), reprinted in 6 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 189, 351 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE]. Bentham (in)famously argued for the panopticon
prison, but his commitment to disciplinary surveillance was not limited to that setting. He
also proposed that the “doors of all public establishments ought to be thrown wide open to
the body of the curious at large—the great open committee of the tribunal of the world.”
JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON; OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE (1791), reprinted in 4
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 37, 46 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
32. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 31, at 355.
33. Id. at 356–57.
34. Id. at 354–55.
35. JEREMY BENTHAM, FARMING DEFENDED (1796), reprinted in 1 WRITINGS ON
THE POOR LAWS 276, 277 (Michael Quinn ed., 2001).
36. FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY:
A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 26–27 (1983) [hereinafter, ROSEN, BENTHAM
AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY]; see also Fred Cutler, Jeremy Bentham and the
Public Opinion Tribunal, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 321, 321 (1999).
37. ROSEN, BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 13–14.
38. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 27 (2017). Post thus explored
the propriety of some forms of regulation under the First Amendment in the United States
as he parsed the distinct values of “democratic legitimation” and “democratic
competence.” See id. at 27–60.
39. See id. at 61–93.
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concept also has application to courts, which serve as a training
ground for such competence.
My account of the function of courts therefore adds to
Bentham’s claims about their educative, disciplinary, and
informational utilities, and to Post’s formulation of the mechanisms
for developing democratic competency. I need to flag that when using
the term “democracy” in the context of courts, I am not focused, as
many others are, on the role played by lay jurors, temporarily holding
the state’s power to render judgment.40 The aspect of “the
democratic” in courts at issue here is that courts provide
opportunities to watch state actors in action, as they accord (or fail to
provide) dignified treatment to litigants, lawyers, and witnesses. The
public also can see that disputants (be they employee or employer,
prisoner or prison official) are required to treat each other civilly as
they argue in public about their disagreements, misbehavior,
wrongdoing, and obligations. Litigation is a social practice that forces
dialogue upon the unwilling (including the government) and
momentarily alters configurations of authority.
Public access to courts enables observers to see what democratic
precepts of equal access to the law and equal treatment by the law
mean in practice. Bentham thought that courts provided education
because judges would naturally want to explain their decisions to
their audience. For me, the state is not only a teacher but also a
student, reminded that all of us have entitlements in democracies to
watch power operate and to receive explanations for the exercise of
power that dispute resolution entails. The observers are, in this
account, a necessary part of the practice of adjudication, anchored in
democratic political norms that the state cannot impose its authority
through unseen and unaccountable acts. Therefore courts are, like
legislatures, a place in which democratic practices can occur in real
time.
When Bentham wrote, courts were not venues available to all.
Employees could not call their employers to account, and prisoners
could not challenge their custodians. Individuals did not have
protection from abusive family members, and gender and racial
discrimination were licit. Twentieth-century egalitarian movements
produced a mix of constitutional and statutory law that recognized all
persons as entitled to equal treatment and thereby welcomed an array

40. See, e.g., Tatjana Hörnle, Democratic Accountability and Lay Participation in
Criminal Trials, in 2 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: JUDGMENT AND CALLING TO ACCOUNT 135–
53 (Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall & Victor Tadros eds., 2006).
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of new participants into the democratic venues that courts were
becoming.41
B.

Expanding Authority to Bring Claims

The aspirations for adjudication in public venues are, however,
haunted by challenges in making its processes equally available across
class lines. In Bentham’s era, as in ours, the costs of litigation posed
problems, which brings me to the second sense of openness, focused
on the capacity of disputants to bring claims. Bentham called the fees
imposed by courts a “tax on distress,”42 as he promoted subsidies for
those too poor to participate.43 He also proposed the establishment of
an “Equal Justice Fund,” supported by using the “fines imposed on
wrongdoers,” government funds, and charitable donations.44 Bentham
wanted not only to subsidize the “costs of legal assistance but also the
costs of transporting witnesses” and the production of other
evidence.45 To lower costs, Bentham proposed that judges be
available “every hour on every day of the year,”46 and he suggested
that courts be on a time “budget” that would shorten proceedings to
one-day trials and include immediate decisions.47
As the twentieth century ushered in new rights-holders,
inequalities became yet more acute. The U.S. Supreme Court
responded by insisting that courts be “open” in the sense of being
accessible even to those who could not pay entry fees for certain
kinds of claims. The canonical decision, Boddie v. Connecticut,48 stems
from the early 1970s, when a class of “welfare recipients residing in
Connecticut” argued that, by failing to create a method by which
41. See RESNIK & CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE, supra note 27, at 288–89.
42. JEREMY BENTHAM, A PROTEST AGAINST LAW-TAXES (1793), reprinted in 2 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 573, 582 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
43. ROSEN, BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 153–
55.
44. Id. at 153–54; PHILLIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JEREMY BENTHAM 310 (2006).
45. ROSEN, BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at 153–
54.
46. Thomas P. Peardon, Bentham’s Ideal Republic, 17 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 184,
196 (1951). Rosen described Bentham’s goal as having all persons, on foot, be able to
reach a local judicial officer and return home without having to pay to find a place to sleep
over night. ROSEN, BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 36, at
149. To lessen expense, Bentham also proposed a system of “referees” or “arbitration”
overseen by judges. Id. at 151.
47. See Anthony J. Draper, “Corruptions in the Administration of Justice”: Bentham’s
Critique of Civil Procedure, 1806-1811, J. BENTHAM STUD., Jan. 2004, at 1, 19,
http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1323720/1/007_Draper_2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/L96N-5KNJ].
48. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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to waive the sixty dollars for filing and service required to obtain a
divorce, the state had violated their federal constitutional
rights.49
In 1971, Justice Harlan agreed; he wrote for the Court that the
combination of “the basic position of the marriage relationship in
this society’s hierarchy of values and the . . . state monopolization”
of lawful dissolution resulted in a due process obligation for the state
to provide access.50 Although the concurrences argued for broader
principles that would have applied beyond the context of divorce,51
Justice Harlan’s language shaped a narrow obligation to waive fees
that permitted other exclusionary fees to remain in place. For
example, the Court thereafter refused to require fee waivers when
individuals sought to challenge a reduction in welfare benefits or
when filing for bankruptcy.52 The parameters of the constitutional
constraints on court charges has, as detailed in Part IV, returned to
the fore as the kinds and numbers of court assessments have
multiplied, with jurisdictions raising fees and “surcharges” in civil,
criminal, and traffic filings.
Other constitutional democracies have taken a broader view of
the obligation to reduce economic barriers to courts. Recent decisions
from both the Supreme Courts of Canada and of the United Kingdom
are illustrative. In 2014, the Canadian Supreme Court found
impermissible an escalating set of fees charged by British Columbia
when litigants’ trials lasted for more than three days.53 Relying on
Section 96 of its Constitution Act of 1867 (providing that the
“Governor General shall appoint the Judges” of provincial courts),54
the Court concluded that litigants had a right to “section 96 courts.”55
As a consequence, British Columbia could not charge hundreds of
dollars if doing so imposed an “undue hardship,” even for persons

49. Id. at 372.
50. Id. at 347.
51. Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 387 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 658–61 (1973); United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434, 446 (1973); see also Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T
v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 86
(2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers].
53. Trial Lawyers Ass’n of B.C. v. British Columbia, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 31, paras. 35–36
(Can.).
54. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 96 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
app. II, no. 5 (Can.).
55. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 3 S.C.R. at para. 29.

96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018)

620

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

who were not “indigent” and therefore not exempt under the
statute.56
In 2017, the U.K. Supreme Court took a similar approach when it
invalidated the high fees imposed by the government on claimants in
its employment tribunals.57 While the schedule varied with the kind of
claims brought by employees, fees ran from £1,200 to £7,200 at the
trial level, to be paid in different stages for filing, hearings, and the
like. In contrast, fees in small claims courts were pegged to the value
of the claim and ranged from £50 to £745.58
Remissions (fee waivers) were available in the employment
tribunals. But the U.K. Supreme Court found the increased fees
unlawful, given that a “right of access to the courts is inherent in the
rule of law” and that the administration of justice was not “merely a
public service like any other.”59 The U.K. Supreme Court spoke not
only of the value of producing precedent, but also emphasized that
businesses need to know, on the one hand, that they will be able
to enforce their rights if they have to do so, and, on the other
hand, that if they fail to meet their obligations, there is likely to
be a remedy against them. It is that knowledge which underpins
everyday economic and social relations.60
Like the Canadian Supreme Court, the U.K. Supreme Court
reasoned that obligations to pay fees ought not be tied only to
poverty. Rather, the question was the impact of fees “in the real
world”; when low or middle-income households had to forego “the
ordinary and reasonable expenditure required to maintain what
would generally be regarded as an acceptable standard of living, the
fees cannot be regarded as affordable.”61
These decisions reflect an understanding of the need for
governments to provide courts as a service, akin to roads and mail
56. Id. at paras. 46, 52. Thereafter, British Columbia amended its fee rules. See B.C.
SUP. CT. CIV. R. 20-5(1). That rule authorizes judges to waive fees if imposing an “undue
hardship” unless the judge determines that “no reasonable claim or defense” is made, or
the case is otherwise abusive. Id.
57. R (on the application of UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [117]
(Lord Reed).
58. Id. at [16]–[20]; see also Abi Adams & Jeremias Prassl, Vexatious Claims:
Challenging the Case for Employment Tribunal Fees, 80 MODERN L. REV. 412, 414, 418
(2017). These economists modeled the impact of the tribunal fees on filings.
59. R (on the application of UNISON), [2017] UKSC at [66]. Lady Hale’s opinion
focused on the discriminatory disparate impact of the fees. Id. at [121]–[34] (Lady Hale).
60. Id. at [71] (Lord Reed). The court also commented: “That is so, notwithstanding
that judicial enforcement of the law is not usually necessary, and notwithstanding that the
resolution of disputes by other methods is often desirable.” Id.
61. Id. at [93].
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and, in some countries, to education and housing. Such affirmative
obligations are often termed “social and economic rights.” Yet, in
contrast to more conventional social and economic rights, courts
support the flourishing not only of individuals but also of the
governments that deploy them. States rely on courts to justify their
power, to implement their norms, and to protect their economies.
It is the mix of state needs for legitimacy and demands for equal
treatment that has produced the proposition that individuals who are
poor as well as those with resources ought to have access to courts, at
least for certain kinds of claims. These are the changes that
democracy has pressed upon courts, now understood as intrinsically
obliged to offer rights of court access and of dignified and equal
treatment for all participants.
This account is of course aspirational. Treating all people fairly
requires work, and responding to economic disparities among litigants
is challenging. Moreover, lawsuits can be used exploitatively,
imposing costs on defendants who ought not to have been brought
into court. The difficulties of calibrating rules to respond to that
strategic interaction while protecting access for meritorious claims are
legion. Many court systems have tried to address these problems, as
reflected in repeated waves of procedural reforms including the
creation of small claims courts, worker compensation systems, and
today’s forms of ADR.
In addition, beginning in the 1980s, state and federal judiciaries
chartered task forces to explore how gender, race, and ethnicity
affected the courts; that research found systemic problems.62 In more
recent decades, the focus has shifted to the high costs of legal services
and to the proliferation of assessments imposed by courts to fund
themselves and municipal services more generally.63 As discussed in
Part IV, a spate of litigation, court-based A2J task forces, and many
articles document the ways in which governments use courts to
extract fees, sometimes to support their own programs and sometimes
as sources of general revenue. That mix makes public oversight one
mechanism for interrupting some of the burdens imposed by LFOs.
62. For an overview of these tasks forces and their findings, see generally Judith
Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952 (1996) [hereinafter Resnik, Asking
About Gender in Courts].
63. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield & Jamie Heine, Life in the Law-Thick World: Legal
Resources for Ordinary Americans, in BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN
AMERICA 21, 21–51 (Sam Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 42–62
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03
/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MV5-CNFU].
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III. MAKING COURTS AND ARBITRATION PUBLIC OR PRIVATE
A. That All Persons “May Freely Come Into, and Attend”
Old and new provisions mandate what today goes under the
moniker of “sunshine” in the courts. The history of the public
performance of state power long predates the US Constitution. The
1676 Charter of the English Colony of West New Jersey is one
example, providing that “in all publick courts of justice for tryals of
causes, civil or criminal, any person or persons . . . may freely come
into, and attend.”64
By the eighteenth century, the new states in North America had
embraced this idea, turning “rites”—the rituals of public performance
of power—into “rights”—the authority of observers to insist on their
place in courts. Several early state constitutions echo the Magna
Carta, with clauses promising remedies for harms to persons and their
property and adding the words “all courts shall be open.”65 For
example, Alabama’s 1819 Constitution provided that “[a]ll courts
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
and right and justice administered, without sale, denial, or delay.”66 A
similar provision can be found in Missouri’s 1820 Constitution:
That courts of justice ought to be open to every person, and
certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property, or
character; and that right and justice ought to be administered
without sale, denial, or delay; and that no private property
ought to be taken or applied to public use without just
compensation.67
The caveat is that “every person” was not all of “us.” Indeed,
Missouri’s 1820 Constitution expressly protected slave owners by
providing that its general assembly had “no power to pass laws . . .

64. CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF WEST NEW JERSEY (1677), reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 184, 188 (Richard L. Perry &
John C. Cooper eds., 1959).
65. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 12; see also Judith Resnik, Constitutional
Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress
Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917, 923 (2012) [hereinafter Resnik, Constitutional
Entitlements].
66. ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 14. An almost identical clause can be found in the
current Alabama Constitution, ratified in 1901. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
67. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII § 7.
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[f]or the emancipation of slaves without the consent of their
owners.”68
The protection of property holders was not limited to slave
owners. Historians identify the insertion of rights-to-remedy clauses
as stemming from creditors’ concerns that “renegade legislatures”
could try to protect debtors by limiting contract obligations.69 Thus,
these clauses are early examples of Galanter’s repeat players, seeking
rules (in this instance of access to courts) to protect their interests in
property and status-conventional relationships. (And, as detailed in
Part IV, recent data on state court users suggest the growing
dominance of creditors’ claims.)
The idea of courts as sources of the recognition of all persons as
equal rights-holders and as ready resources for the array of humanity
is an artifact in the United States of both the first and second
Reconstruction. Not until well into the twentieth century did U.S. law
and practice fully embrace the proposition that whatever one’s race,
gender, or class, courts had to welcome all entrants.70 “Every person”
came to reference all of “us” as a result of twentieth-century
aspirations that democratic orders provide “equal justice under law,” a
phrase etched in 1935 above the steps to the U.S. Supreme Court but
not inclusive in the way we understand it today until decades
thereafter.71
During the second half of the twentieth century, legislatures and
courts recognized new kinds of harms as coming within the rubric of
what constituted a legal injury. Rights to be free from discrimination
are vivid examples, as are the developments of rights for consumers,
employees, household members, and criminal defendants. As courts
became more accessible to such claimants, the stakes of openness
changed. Remedies obtained in courts underscored for some the
importance of openness and sparked efforts by others, unhappy at
having to disgorge information and to provide remedies, to try to

68. Id. art. III, § 26.
69. See Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Mo. 2000) (en banc) (quoting David
Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1992)). Indeed, in 1946,
Missouri’s Supreme Court relied on its remedy clause to protect segregated housing by
holding that racially restrictive covenants were enforceable, in part to avoid denying court
access for enforcement of contractual obligations. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 683
(Mo. 1946) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
70. Practices, of course, have not always mapped onto these aspirations. See Resnik,
Asking About Gender in Courts, supra note 62, at 952–54.
71. See Judith Resnik & Dennis E. Curtis, Inventing Democratic Courts: A New and
Iconic Supreme Court, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 207, 233 (2013).

96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018)

624

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

limit both the ability to bring claims to open courts and the
opportunity to learn about others’ allegations.
B.

Sunshine in Government and in its Courts

Open-court practices in the United States reflect a more general
view of public rights to observe government. Commitments to protect
public access come from both federal and state constitutions. The
U.S. Constitution provides that Congress “keep a journal of its
Proceedings” and publish it periodically, subject to its “Judgment” on
a need for “Secrecy.”72 Congress is also obliged to make and publish a
“regular Statement and Account” of its use of public monies.73
Statutes such as the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 demonstrate
popular support to put such obligations (albeit with caveats and
exceptions) into place.74
While the U.S. Constitution does not have the language common
to many state constitutions mandating that “all courts shall be open,”
the Sixth Amendment provides an express guarantee to criminal
defendants of a “speedy and public trial” before a jury drawn from
the vicinage.75 The scope of the provision is brought into question
when the public is excluded from criminal proceedings. The case law
has recognized both defendants’ rights to have an audience76 and the
public’s First Amendment rights to be an audience.77 Rights of
assembly and to petition for redress are sometimes also cited as bases
for the public’s entitlement to open courts.78
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Section 7 required recording the names of persons voting
“Yeas and Nays.” Id. art. I, § 7.
73. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Implementation comes from the Congressional Record and the
Government Printing Office. Court enforcement has, however, been made difficult by
rulings concluding that individuals lack standing to seek enforcement. See, e.g., United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 167–68, 170 (1974). Richardson found that the Court’s
doctrine on standing prevented reaching the merits of a challenge to the CIA’s
withholding of information on its expenditures. Id.
74. See Freedom of Information Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
76. See, e.g., Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (2017); Presley v.
Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 210–11, 216 (2010).
77. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 503–05
(1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 559–63, 580 (1980) (plurality
opinion); see also Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV.
405, 409 (1987) [hereinafter Resnik, Public Dimension]. The Sixth Amendment right of
the defendant is sometimes either itself the basis of access by third parties or related to a
First Amendment right or “freedom” of the public to “listen.” Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 576.
78. For example, prisoners have rights of access to bring claims, and in the discussion
of such cases, the Court has on occasion referenced petitioning rights. The central decision
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As noted, state constitutional provisions often have texts
directing openness. Florida offers an exemplar of the depth of
commitments to “sunshine laws.” Its Constitution of 1839 had a
familiar rendition of the “open courts/rights-to-remedies” text,79
which was updated in 1968 to be gender neutral.80 A new provision,
added in 2002, protected public access to proceedings in other
branches of government by giving “[e]very person” rights to “inspect
or copy any public record,” including materials from the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches.81 That amendment reflects an
important substantive point: that an insistence on openness comes
from political and social movements; a referendum produced the
amendment to the Florida Constitution.82

of Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), was limited in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
351 (1996). In finding that states have “affirmative obligations to assure all prisoners
meaningful access to the courts,” the Bounds Court emphasized the role that law libraries
and other legal assistance play in helping prisoners prepare for their defense. Bounds, 430
U.S. at 824–26. But several years later, the Court in Lewis held that “Bounds did not
create an abstract, free standing right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis, 518 U.S.
at 351. Rights of assembly are discussed in United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389
U.S. 217, 221–22 (1967).
79. FLA. CONST. of 1839, art. I, § 9 (“That all courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law; and right and justice administered, without sale, denial, or delay.”).
80. FLA. C ONST . of 1968, art. I, § 21 (“The courts shall be open to every
person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial or delay.”).
81. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 24(a) (“Every person has the right to inspect or copy any
public record made or received in connection with the official business of any public body,
officer, or employee of the state. . . . This section specifically includes the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government.”).
82. Florida had a 1905 public access law applicable to “formal” municipal meetings.
Act of May 24, 1905, ch. 5463, 1905 Fla. Sess. Laws 157, 157 (repealed 1974) (“All
meetings of any City or Town Council or Board of Aldermen of any City or Town in the
State of Florida, shall be held open to the public of any such City or Town, and all Records
and Books of any such City or Town shall be at all times open to the inspection of any
citizens thereof.”). A more general statute protected public access in 1967. Act of July 1,
1967, ch. 67-356, 1967 Fla. Sess. Laws 1147, 1147–48 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 286.011 (West, Westlaw through the 2017 First Reg. Sess. and Special “A” Sess.)).
After a 1978 Constitution Revision Commission had proposed a constitutional provision,
which was not enacted, the Florida Supreme Court held that the public records law did not
apply to the legislature. See Locke v. Hawkes, 595 So. 2d 32, 37 (Fla. 1992).
Popular support for making the change followed, resulting in open access at state
and local levels. See William A. Buzzett & Deborah K. Kearney, Commentary to 1992
Addition, art. I, § 24 (1992 Comm. Substitute for House Joint Resolutions 1727, 863 &
2035). As they explain, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision
meant that records of legislators, as well as those of the governor and cabinet
officers, at least with respect to the exercise of their constitutional powers, were
not subject to the law. The decision caused a stir among the public and particularly
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The 2002 amendment, focused on branches of government other
than the judiciary, interacts with Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation Act,
prohibiting courts from entering an order whose “purpose or effect”
is to conceal “a public hazard or any information concerning a public
hazard.”83 Also prohibited are court orders and judgments cutting off
“any information which may be useful to members of the public in
protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public
hazard.”84 At least twenty other states have statutes or court rules
constraining in various ways the ability to make unavailable court
documents and outcomes.85 Some of these obligations came in
response to suppression of information in cases alleging abuse of
children by members of the clergy or about harms caused by faulty
products such as exploding lighters, just as #MeToo is prompting
efforts to curb nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”) involving sexual
misconduct.86
the press. Efforts were quickly begun for constitutional change, which concluded
with the successful passage of this amendment.
Id.; see also Sandra F. Chance & Christina Locke, The Government-in-the Sunshine
Law Then and Now: A Model for Implementing New Technologies Consistent with
Florida’s Position as a Leader in Open Government, 35 FLA. ST. L. REV. 245, 247–57
(2008).
83. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(7) (West, Westlaw through the 2017 First Reg. Sess.
and Special “A” Sess.). In 1999, Florida also required that its Department of Public Health
publish on the Internet payment of malpractice claims in excess of a specified amount. Id.
§ 627.912(6)(a) (Westlaw).
84. Id. § 69.081(3) (Westlaw).
85. Judith Resnik, Uncovering, Disclosing, and Discovering How the Public
Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 521, 564 (2006);
see also Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing
Public Access to Information Generated through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 380
(2006). A list of state open records laws can be found at Open Government Guide,
REPORTERS COMM. FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (2011), https://www.rcfp.org/opengovernment-guide [https://perma.cc/Y7WP-FP6S]. See also State Public Record Laws,
FOIADVOCATES (2018), http://www.foiadvocates.com/records.html [https://perma.cc
/M9EX-67G3].
86. New York case law describes the “broad presumption that the public is entitled to
access to judicial proceedings and court records.” Mosallem v. Berenson, 905 N.Y.S. 2d
575, 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 216.1(a)
(2017). Some states have provisions focused on disclosure of settlements as well. See, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-17a (West, Westlaw through 2017 Jan. Reg. Sess. and 2017
June Special Sess.) (requiring that, “[u]pon entry of any medical malpractice award or
upon entering a settlement of a malpractice claim” against those licensed under other
provisions, the entity making payment or the party is to notify the Department of Public
Health of “the terms of the award or settlement” as well as to provide a copy along with
the complaint and answer); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-22.21 to 9-22.25 (West, Westlaw
through 2017) (originally enacted in June of 2003 and requiring that all “medical
malpractice court judgments and all medical malpractice arbitration awards” in which a
complaining party had received an award within the five most recent years be made
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These state practices are the tip of what at the outset I termed
the doctrinal openness of courts, supported by an array of
constitutional provisions and statutes. Open court directives in state
constitutions are but one piece of the scaffolding that supports a
shared sense that courts are intrinsically open. Adding to the edifice
of openness are rights to jury trials in civil and criminal cases, coupled
with criminal defendants’ rights to confrontation, cross-examination,
and, as mentioned, a “speedy and public trial,” as well as English
common law traditions.
Atop this mélange of constitutional and common law comes a
host of statutes and regulations directing both federal and state
judiciaries to publish a wealth of data about themselves. Public
records name every judge appointed in the federal and state systems.
Statistics on cases come from systems begun in the nineteenth
century. In 1871, the Attorney General of the United States began
providing compilations on caseloads.87 That task was taken over in
1939 by the Administrative Office of the United States (“AO”),
which works with federal district and appellate courts to file reports
annually on the “business” of the federal courts.88
This documentation is not only predicated on ideologies
promoting open courts; the documentation is also embedded in the
political economy of courts. Judges need to convince their coordinate
branches to provide funding, and the statistics on demand for services
are regularly submitted as evidence of the needs for support. The
federal judiciary continues to be successful in maintaining its budget
allocations even as other segments of the government have suffered
cuts. For fiscal year 2017, the federal judiciary requested (and
available to the public in profiles of physicians and podiatrists licensed to practice in the
state of New Jersey); see also Med. Soc’y of N.J. v. Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d 254 (D.N.J.
2004) (holding New Jersey Health Care Consumer Information Act valid under federal
Health Care Quality Improvement Act and U.S. Constitution).
Federal legislation has been proposed but not enacted that would limit the
issuance of protective orders for materials provided through discovery and require judges
not to enforce provisions in settlements mandating nondisclosure (aside from funds paid)
of terms “relevant to the protection of public health or safety.” See Sunshine in Litigation
Act of 2017, H.R. 1053, 115th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (2017).
87. See PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91–
95 (1973); David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal
District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 97 (1981).
88. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604, 610 (2012). The Director of the AO files reports
annually. See, e.g., Judicial Business 2016, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2016 [https://perma.cc/NBU6P9WC]. For the history of the development of this administrative apparatus, see Judith
Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113
HARV. L. REV. 924, 937–38 (2000).

96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018)

628

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

received) some seven billion dollars in discretionary appropriations, a
3.2% increase above fiscal year 2016 funding.89
With the advent of PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic
Records), computer docketing puts federal court filings into a public
database permitting readers to view pleadings and to track the
submissions and dispositions in particular cases.90 As computerfacilitated access replaces labor-intensive searches through file
drawers, problems familiar to computer users emerge about how to
protect public information while recognizing the privacy interests of
individuals.91 For example, certain forms of personal information,
such as Social Security numbers, are redacted. Concern about
litigants’ vulnerability is also the basis for federal appellate rules
limiting remote electronic access by the public (but not the
government) to documents in immigration cases.92
Obligations to report judicial statistics exist in the states,93 albeit
often supported by fewer resources than in the federal system. The
89. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE JUDICIARY FY 2018
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUMMARY REVISED i (2017) [hereinafter FY 2018 JUDICIARY
BUDGET],
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fy_2018_congressional_budget
_summary_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC2Q-P2RB]; Judiciary Transmits Fiscal Year 2017
Budget Request to Congress, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (Feb. 12, 2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2016/02/12/judiciary-transmits-fiscal-year-2017-budget-requestcongress [https://perma.cc/76B2-YJPB]. For fiscal year 2018, the courts requested $7.19
billion, a 3.8% increase over the previous year. FY 2018 JUDICIARY BUDGET, supra, at i.
90. See PACER, https://www.pacer.gov [http://perma.cc/94AA-3GCV].
91. See David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of
Practical Obscurity, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1387; Karen Eltis, The Judicial System in
the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship between Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber
Context, 56 MCGILL L.J. 289, 295–300 (2011); Nancy S. Marder, From “Practical
Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding of Public Information, 59 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 441, 443–50 (2009); see also B.C. CIVIL RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL, ACCESS TO
RECORDS AND INFORMATION IN CRT DISPUTES: POLICY 001-20151215, at 1–5, 12–17
(2015)
[hereinafter
BRITISH COLUMBIA CRT, ACCESS TO RECORDS],
https://civilresolutionbc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Access-to-Info-in-CRT-CaseRecords.pdf [https://perma.cc/P542-ZNW8].
92. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a)–(c); FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(5); Conference on Privacy
and Internet Access to Court Files, Panel Two: Should There be Remote Access to Court
Filings in Immigration Cases?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 25, 25 (2010).
93. See ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, SHAUNA M.
STRICKLAND & KATHRYN A. HOLT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 1–2 (2012),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/OtherPages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/
CSP_DEC.ashx [http://perma.cc/NXV9-BYSX]; NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
COURT GUIDE TO STATISTICAL REPORTING 1 (2017) http://www.courtstatistics.org/~
/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/State%20Court%20Guide%20to%20Statistical%20Reporting
%20v%202point1point2.ashx [https://perma.cc/FF23-VWGR]; Reporting Excellence
Awards, 2016, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS. (2016), http://www.courtstatistics.org
/Other-Pages/Awards.aspx [https://perma.cc/56F7-G4T9].
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Court Statistics Act in Illinois is illustrative, as it requires officials to
provide “information, statistical data, and reports bearing on the state
of the dockets and business transacted by the courts and other
matters pertinent to the efficient operation of the judicial system.”94
Implementation can be complex because Illinois, like some other
states, does not have a “unified” system. Each county has degrees of
autonomy that make data collection challenging, which is also
reflected in efforts by the Illinois Task Force on Court Assessments to
identify the welter of fees that each county can impose.95 In short,
through constitutional doctrine, rulemaking, litigant filings, task
forces, obligations to account for funds, and the need to obtain more,
courts are “a huge information system—an entity that receives,
processes, stores, creates, monitors, and disseminates large quantities
of documents and information.”96
C.

Functional Privatization in Courts, Arbitration, and Online

The shape of this “huge information system” requires further
interrogation, as do ideas about its dissemination and its relationship
to knowledge and to justice. Here the plot thickens, as I turn from
doctrinal openness to what happens at a functional level, where there
is less to see than one would expect.
Four sets of practices (as they are currently formatted) close off
public purview. One is the reformatting of rules of court to shift from
adjudication toward management and settlement. Another is the
devolution of court authority to agencies that often do not provide
ready access to their adjudicatory processes. A third is online dispute
resolution, which relies on computer exchanges among disputants and
sometimes third parties to resolve conflict. A fourth (that may also
use web-based technologies) is the outsourcing to arbitrators or other
private providers, who in turn impose mandates (generally enforced
by courts) to keep arbitration processes bilateral and confidential.
I do not here debate whether mediation, early neutral
evaluation, ODR, arbitration, and other forms of resolution are
94. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/1 (West, Westlaw through Pub. Acts effective Jan.
8, 2018). The Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (“AOIC”)—like its counterparts
across the country—issues annual reports containing caseload statistics, disposition
information, and more. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT
OF
THE
ILLINOIS
COURTS:
STATISTICAL
SUMMARY
101
(2015),
http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/SupremeCourt/AnnualReport/2015/2015_Statistical_Summary.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RWF3-8B9J].
95. ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 1–2.
96. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF
LEGAL SERVICES 201 (2008).
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“good” on the variety of metrics (speed, accuracy, economy,
informality, generativity, etc.) that have been discussed.97 My focus is
on the impact of the shifts to these processes on access to knowledge
about justice-seeking. My questions are about the ease of knowing
their rules, watching their processes, and learning their outcomes
under the frameworks shaped through thousands of alternative civil
procedural rules.
1. Court-Based Alternative Dispute Resolution
Various forms of ADR are based in courts and organized by
national and state statutes, and by local rules that suggest or require
the use of mediation, arbitration, and other settlement-focused
techniques. Those rules rarely reference the public. To the extent
third parties are mentioned, the context is usually an admonition that
confidentiality is required of participants in court-based ADR
processes.
An example comes from the federal courts. As is familiar, in
1983, and then again in 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were revised to promote conflict management and settlement in lieu
of adjudication.98 These changes represent a movement away from the
1938 court-based litigation model (with its due process predicates) to
what I have suggested should be called “Contract Procedure,”99 in
which judges strive to end cases through agreements.100
Central to this shift have been amendments to Rule 16,
governing pretrial procedures in civil cases in federal court. In
contrast to criminal rules in which court-based activities such as
“pleas, sentencing, case conferences, and adjournments” are generally
held in courtrooms,101 the civil rules do not specify that pretrial
97. See, e.g., Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, What We Know (and Need to Know)
about Court-Annexed Dispute Resolution, 67 S.C. L. REV. 245, 245–47, 262–65 (2016).
98. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 612–14
(2003) [hereinafter Resnik, Procedure as Contract]; see also Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–80 (1982).
99. Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 98, at 598.
100. Ellen E. Deason, Beyond “Managerial Judges”: Appropriate Roles in Settlement,
78 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 88–104 (2017).
101. Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127
HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2175 (2014); see also El Vocero de P.R. v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147,
147–50 (1993); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8–13
(1986); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 505–10 (1984).
Simonson argued that the U.S. Constitution obliges judiciaries to keep all nontrial criminal adjudication open and that, given the decline of jury trials, this right is underenforced. Simonson, supra, at 2177–79, 2206–21. Her examples included the routine
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meetings be open to the public or on the record.102 As I noted at the
outset, some judges do their pretrial work on the bench and on the
record. Others do so in chambers, in part based on the view that
privacy facilitates agreements and that concessions are more readily
made if they cannot be used later at trial or in other proceedings.103
Other changes to the Federal Rules also move information away
from public access. Discovery materials are no longer routinely filed
in courts unless appended to motions; pre-discovery confidentiality
agreements have become routine.104 Settlements conditioned on nondisclosure of terms are commonplace, as reflected both in the NDA
acronym for them and by recent accounts of sexual harassment claims
that had been settled by requiring silence.105 Even when settlements
are presented in courts, facets may remain undisclosed.106
2. Online Dispute Resolution
ODR is a form of ADR using web-based technologies that can
turn computers into venues for dispute resolution.107 Expanding use
of e-commerce and of computer-based government services prompted
the turn to ODR,108 offered sometimes through ad hoc arrangements
and increasingly institutionalized. Promotion of this format comes
from private entities aiming to expand their markets. Some courtbased systems, such as British Columbia, with its new Civil
Resolution Tribunal, discussed below, are also advocates of ODR.
That court’s adoption of ODR illustrates how the categorization of
closing of arraignments and misdemeanor courtrooms in certain localities and ad hoc
exclusions, sometimes based on limited space for observers. Id. at 2191–93. Further, she
argued that an “audience of locals” was particularly important in that defendants are
disproportionately from minority communities and under-represented among the
professional participants in courtrooms. Id. at 2202–05.
102. Conferencing by telephone is contemplated as an option for scheduling
conferences. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
103. See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for
Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 323–27 (1994).
104. See Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery
Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2189–92 (2014). Benham surveyed the use of
“return-or-destroy” provisions required as a predicate either to discovery or to settlement,
and the relaxed standard for granting protective orders of disclosures made. Id.
105. See Daniel Hemel, How Nondisclosure Agreements Protect Sexual Predators, VOX
(Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2017/10/9/16447118/confidentialityagreement-weinstein-sexual-harassment-nda [https://perma.cc/55H3-JKT4].
106. See, e.g., SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).
107. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2847–48 n.212.
108. For an overview of the various forms of ODR, see generally Ayelet Sela, The
Effect of Online Technologies on Dispute Resolution System Design: Antecedents, Current
Trends, and Future Directions, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 635 (2017) [hereinafter Sela,
The Effect of Online Technologies].

96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018)

632

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

ODR as an alternative to courts will become less useful as courts use
ODR as a form of adjudication.
The advantages proffered are speed, assistance for
unrepresented disputants,109 ease of communication and of
information sharing,110 the potential to generate more cooperative
behavior, and methods for parties to come to resolutions. For
example, one technique to identify mutually-agreed upon settlement
points is through computer-based “blind-bidding systems.”111
Accomplishing these goals varies with the technological sophistication
of a particular system.112 Enthusiasm for doing so runs high, as
reflected in a “vision” statement from senior members of the U.K.
judiciary committed to enlisting technology to transform civil justice
into a unified, paper-free system.113
In the United States, ODR is coming to the fore through
corporate-based efforts. In what is called a “B2C” or “business-toconsumer” contract, some companies require using ODR. Providers,
such as Modria, argue that costs and delays render court-based
consumer redress “broken,” and that ODR is the useful
replacement.114 Proponents seek to assuage concerns about repeatplayer advantages by pointing to the need for businesses to have good
reputations that, in turn, require them to be consumer friendly by
offering remedies for faulty products or services.115 Rarely discussed is

109. See Maximilian A. Bulinski & J.J. Prescott, Online Case Resolution Systems:
Enhancing Access, Fairness, Accuracy, and Efficiency, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 205, 221
(2016); Ayelet Sela, Streamlining Justice: How Online Courts Can Resolve the Challenges
of Pro Se Litigation, 26 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 331, 341 (2016).
110. See J.J. Prescott, Improving Access to Justice in State Courts with Platform
Technology, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1993, 2020–26 (2017).
111. See Sela, The Effect of Online Technologies, supra note 108, at 665–67.
112. Id. at 649–67.
113. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, TRANSFORMING OUR JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (2016),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/553261/joint
-vision-statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS29-HPWP]; see also JOE TOMLINSON, UNIV. OF
SHEFFIELD, A PRIMER ON THE DIGITISATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 14–17
(2017),
https://lawandgoodadministration.files.wordpress.com/2017/09/a-primer-on-thedigitisation-of-administrative-tribunals1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9FNW-HEPV]; Dame Hazel
Genn, Dean, Univ. Coll. of London Faculty of Laws, 2017 Birkenhead Lecture (Oct. 16,
2017).
114. See AMY J. SCHMITZ & COLIN RULE, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 7–8 (2017); see also Amy J.
Schmitz, Remedy Realities in Business-to-Consumer Contracting, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 213,
262 (2016) [hereinafter Schmitz, Remedy Realities]; Expanding Access to Justice with
Online Dispute Resolution, TYLER TECH., https://www.tylertech.com/solutionsproducts/modria [https://perma.cc/WJ4W-XQ45].
115. See, e.g., Schmitz, Remedy Realities, supra note 114, at 236–37.

96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018)

2018]

OPEN COURTS AND ARBITRATIONS

633

the absence of competition in some markets, making “shopping” for
alternative providers elusive.
Information about third-party involvement in or access to ODR
in the United States is sparse. A few online providers have built in
“jury-like” mechanisms, whereby disputants can submit conflicts and
panels of similarly situated individuals (such as other customers) can
provide feedback or resolutions through polling and aggregating
opinions.116 While companies such as eBay are reported to resolve
some sixty million disputes a year, in part through software that
requires no “human intervention,” the underlying data are not
available for public inspection.117 The “corporation as courthouse” in
the U.S. system has no mandates to open its doors or its files to third
parties.118
While the United States provides an example of largely
unregulated ODR, the European Union (“EU”) and the court system
in British Columbia offer models of government-sponsored and
government-monitored ODR. The EU’s interest in facilitating crossborder trades has prompted it to focus on cross-border remedies,
especially for relatively small claims.119 Rule-makers in British
Columbia likewise describe the need to lower the costs of small
claims.120 An important distinction for those familiar with ADR in the
United States is that the EU’s Directives make such procedures
supplemental. Member States may require the use of ADR, but such
procedures may not be exclusive or preclusive of court-based

116. Sela, The Effect of Online Technologies, supra note 108, at 659–61, 674–75.
117. COLIN RULE, MODRIA, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EXPANDING ACCESS TO
JUSTICE 5 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/office_president
/colin_rule_programs_to_bridge_the_gap_slides.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2JN-AZNB]. In
Part IV, I provide some data, based on state mandates for providers to provide
information on consumer arbitrations. As I detail, those statutes do not require making
files publicly accessible, nor do they address ODR.
118. Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. REG. 547, 554–69,
578–85 (2016).
119. See Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
May 2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending
Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 63, 63
[hereinafter, EC ADR Consumer Disputes Directive 2013/11] (“Ensuring access to simple,
efficient, fast and low-cost ways of resolving domestic and cross-border disputes which
arise from sales or service contracts should benefit consumers and therefore boost their
confidence in the market. That access should apply to online as well as to offline
transactions, and is particularly important when consumers shop across borders.”).
120. The British Columbia provisions can be found at Rules, CIVIL RESOLUTION
TRIBUNAL 3, 5 (July 12, 2017), https://civilresolutionbc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/07
/CRT-rules-effective-July-12-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PQF-YN5Q].
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redress.121 While seen as an “efficient way of obtaining redress in mass
harm situations,” the European Commission commends that such
procedures should “always be available alongside, or as a voluntary
element of, judicial collective redress.”122
In 2013, EU regulations called for a web-based “platform” for
ODR on which disputants could submit complaints.123 The relevant
directive also required registered ADR providers to be “independent,
impartial, transparent, effective, fast and fair.”124 The regulations
called for public databases (protective of personal data) to enable
monitoring of ODR’s use and functioning through compiling
consumer complaints and scoreboards that evaluated access and use
of the online system.125 In 2016, the European Commission launched a
new “online dispute resolution platform,” to be made available in any
of the EU’s twenty-three official languages.126 Businesses selling
121. Member states may make “participation in ADR procedures mandatory, provided
that such legislation does not prevent the parties from exercising their right of access to
the judicial system.” EC ADR Consumer Disputes Directive 2013/11, supra note 119, at
70. Under the law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), national bodies
interpret this obligation. See, e.g., Case C-75/16, Menini v. Banco Popolare Società
Cooperativa, 2017 E.C.L.I. 132, ¶¶ 48, 57, 69–71 (Feb. 16, 2017).
122. Commission Recommendation 2013/396/EU, on Common Principles for
Injunctive and Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States
Concerning Violation of Rights Granted Under Union Law, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60, 61.
Whether ODR in Europe will remain a voluntary option is also a question; some critics
argue that consumers are hurt by the ability of providers to require more expensive forms
of process to obtain remedies. See Maxime Hanriot, Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) as
a Solution to Cross Border Consumer Disputes: The Enforcement of Outcomes, 2 MCGILL
J. DISP. RES. 1, 4 (2016).
123. Regulation (EU) 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21
May 2013 on Online Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending
Regulation (EC) 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, 2013 O.J. (L 165) 1, 2 [hereinafter
EU Regulation Online Dispute Resolution Consumer Disputes 524/2013].
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id. at 2–3. See Alternative and Online Dispute Resolution (ADR/ODR),
EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/nonjudicial_redress/adr-odr/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/6WS2-JLSS] [hereinafter EU
ADR/ODR]. As of 2008, researchers reported that systems in place for consumer ADR in
Europe responded to about half a million claims annually, and many of the processes were
free of charge. See CHRISTOPHER HODGES, IRIS BENÖHR & NAOMI CREUTZFELDTBANDA, CONSUMER ADR IN EUROPE 18–20, 368, 380 (2012); see also Maude Piers,
Europe’s Role in Alternative Dispute Resolution: Off to a Good Start?, 2 J. DISP. RESOL.
279, 279 (2014).
126. EU ADR/ODR, supra note 125; Online Dispute Resolution, EUROPEAN COMM’N
(2016), https://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/main/index.cfm?event=main.home2.show&lng=EN
[https://perma.cc/3L5S-BMTH]; see also EU Regulation Online Dispute Resolution
Consumer Disputes 524/2013, supra note 123, at 11. Denmark has been described as at the
forefront of implementation. See Sylvia Cécile Cavaleri, Digitalizing Dispute Resolution
Processes: The Example of Denmark, in VI YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION AND ADR (Marianne Roth & Michael Geistlinger eds., forthcoming 2018).
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goods or services online are required to tell consumers about the
availability of the system, which is part of a larger “E-justice”
project.127 The goal is to make ODR more accessible through
“national platform points” offering cross-border online remedies.128
Policing of ODR comes not only through regulations, but also
from courts. In 2010, in Alassini v. Italian Telecom,129 the Court of
Justice for the European Union (“CJEU”) concluded that the
company’s online ADR program was not an impermissible and
disproportionate burden on rights to a fair hearing, protected by
European treaties.130 The CJEU’s caveats were that courts in Member
States had to be able to assess ADR programs’ burdensomeness;
settlement outcomes could not be binding; the ADR efforts could not
impose a “substantial delay” in bringing legal proceedings; time-bars
would need to be tolled; forms of judicial “interim measures” would
remain available; and settlement procedures could not be available
only electronically.131 Yet even as the EU system insists on public
access to information and oversight uncommon in the United States,
it has not built in opportunities for third parties to watch or to read
the ODR interactions as they take place.
The challenges of creating open ODR systems are addressed by
procedures promulgated by British Columbia,132 which describe the
efforts to balance public access and personal privacy in light of the
risks that online information could be manipulated and
appropriated.133 As noted, the work in British Columbia also
exemplifies the ways in which ODR is shifting from being an ADR
process to becoming the court process itself.
The new “Tribunal Decision Process” is part of British
Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal (“CRT”), which is to “replace a
model” of in-person open dispute resolution of property disputes
(“generally open to the public”) with an ODR process reliant on
written submissions, as long as parties do not opt out of that
process.134 The exchanges also aim to encourage negotiation, that, as
127. See EU ADR/ODR, supra note 125.
128. See id.; VĔRA JOUROVÁ, EUROPEAN COMM’N, SETTLING CONSUMER DISPUTES
ONLINE 1–3 (2016), http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_disputes/docs/adrodr.factsheet_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EVC-XZRT].
129. Case C-317/08, Alassini v. Telecom Italia SpA 2010 E.C.R. I-2213.
130. Id. at I-2557.
131. Id. at I-2252; see also Case C-75/16, Menini v. Banco Popolare Società
Cooperativa, 2017 E.C.L.I. 457 ¶ 80.
132. See BRITISH COLUMBIA CRT, ACCESS TO RECORDS, supra note 91.
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id.at 2.
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the policy governing “Access to Records and Information in CRT
Disputes” discusses,135 would (if not online) often take place in
private settings. The policy does not organize access to materials from
those exchanges. The policy concluded that it would not seek to make
those exchanges public nor was it “practical to provide the public with
the opportunity to observe the Tribunal Decision Process as it
occurs.”136 Instead, the policy created a structure for the public to
learn about the decisions and achieve “transparency . . . by posting
CRT final decisions on a publicly accessible website”137 Further, the
policy permits members public (upon payment of a fee) then to see
the “evidence submitted.”138
3. Arbitration and Confidentiality Mandates
Turn, then, from resolutions through negotiation in or out of
court to arbitration, in which a third party renders a decision. As the
term “court-annexed arbitration” reflects, statutes or court-based
rules in some jurisdictions send cases to court-appointed arbitrators,
who are generally lawyers. If unsatisfied, litigants may sometimes
return to court; the disincentive in some jurisdictions is that if a better
outcome does not result, fees or costs may be imposed.
Learning about the public dimensions of court-annexed
arbitrations requires searching for relevant statutes, looking at local
court rules, and calling court staff. For example, in the federal courts,
authorization for court-annexed arbitration came in the 1988 Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act139 when Congress permitted
ten federal district courts to mandate it for a limited set of cases
involving monetary damages under $100,000.140 The statute also
135. Id. at 3.
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id.
138. Id. To summarize, the negotiation and mediation phases are distinct from the
Tribunal Decision Process, which is the phase where information may be provided
publicly. See Information Access & Privacy Policy, CIVIL RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL,
https://civilresolutionbc.ca/resources/information-access-privacy-policy/#will-the-crt-share-myinformation-with-the-public [https://perma.cc/3UYP-CRKZ].
139. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 101, 102
Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2012)) (creating
committee to “examine problems and issues currently facing the courts of the United
States” and to “develop a long-range plan for the future of the Federal judiciary”).
140. Id. § 652, 102 Stat. at 4659. Note that the 1998 revision does not include the
limitation precluding cases that include novel issues. In the 1998 Amendment, as well as
the original 1988 statute, if the court’s jurisdiction rested on 28 U.S.C. § 1343, which is
available for cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arbitration is not permitted. See
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 654, 112 Stat. 2993,
2995–96 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2012)).
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provided for trial de novo, with assessment of fees for arbitration if
the outcome at trial was less favorable than had been achieved in
arbitration.141
The 1988 provisions neither addressed the role of the public at
such proceedings nor spoke in general about confidentiality. The
statute stated that awards were not to be “made known” to judges
assigned to the cases, so as to insulate them from being affected by
that information if litigation resumed.142 Further, the materials
adduced during arbitration and the awards made were not to be
admitted as evidence if a trial took place subsequent to the
arbitration.143
A decade later, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998
required that all federal district courts “authorize, by local rule . . . ,
the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions,”
including the “use of arbitration.”144 Congress specified court
authority to appoint additional personnel (“neutrals and
arbitrators”)145 and called for the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) and
the AO to “assist the district courts in the establishment and
improvement” of programs.146 That statute also described arbitrators
as “performing quasi-judicial functions” and, therefore, both subject
to the rules of disqualification applicable to federal judges and
protected by doctrines of immunity from suit developed for judges.147
As for third-party access, Congress imposed a general
admonition that district courts protect the “confidentiality of the

141. In the 1988 provisions, Congress had provided that if a party did less well in the de
novo trial, fee-shifting was permissible. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act, § 655(a), 102 Stat. at 4661.
142. Id. § 654(b), 102 Stat. at 4661 (“Sealing of Arbitration Award”).
143. Id. § 655(c), 102 Stat. at 4661 (“Limitation on Admission of Evidence”). This
constraint adds arbitration proceedings to the limits imposed by federal evidentiary rules
that have, since 1975, precluded admission of information obtained in a mediation or
settlement conference for the purpose of proving or disproving “the validity or amount of
a disputed claim.” FED. R. EVID. 408(a).
144. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 651(b), 112 Stat. at 2993–94. The
Act explained that its provisions were not to affect existing programs under the 1988
statute. Id. § 654(d), 112 Stat. at 2996. Those provisions altered somewhat the category of
cases eligible for arbitration. See 28 U.S.C. §654(a) (2012) (authorizing referrals of “any
civil action (including any adversary proceeding in bankruptcy) pending before it when the
parties consent, except” actions based on “an alleged violation of a right secured by the
Constitution of the United States,” or when jurisdiction is based “in whole or in part on
section 1343 of this title,” or when the relief sought in monetary damages exceeds
$150,000).
145. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 651(a), 112 Stat. at 2993.
146. Id. § 651(f), 112 Stat. at 2994.
147. Id. § 655(c), 112 Stat. at 2996.
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alternative dispute resolution processes” through prohibitions on
“disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications.”148
The statute does not address whether arbitration proceedings
constitute “confidential dispute resolution communications.”149 In
practice, few of the ninety-four federal district courts use courtannexed arbitration,150 and as of 2011, the national tally counted
fewer than 3,000 cases in such programs.151 Three districts referred
more than a hundred cases annually, and others referred none.152
What about public access? Because local rules generally do not
address this question, district-by-district inquiries were required. As
of 2014, in the eight districts that had some court-annexed arbitration,
five treated such proceedings as private; three, including two districts
reporting a few hundred court-annexed arbitrations, permitted the
public to attend.153 In short, doctrines and structures of openness can
be found in some federal court-annexed arbitration programs.154
The same can be said for state-based court-annexed arbitration.
Illinois provides an example, as it has a relatively large volume of
cases involved in its program. In 2011, Illinois courts sent more than
41,000 cases to a “mandatory, non-binding, non-court procedure

148. Id. § 652(d), 112 Stat. at 2995 (“Confidentiality Provisions”). Congress called on
districts to adopt local rules implementing confidentiality and, in the interim, provided this
provision.
149. Very little case law cites to the statute. One decision in 2007 that did is Stepp v.
NCR Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 826, 836–37 (S.D. Ohio 2007). There, an employee had lost a
job and alleged age discrimination, and the employer sought confidential compulsory
arbitration outside of the courts. Id. at 828. The district court rejected the claim that
closure failed to vindicate his statutory rights by citing not only the case law on the Federal
Arbitration Act, but also 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1948), which the court read as providing
“confidentiality in court mandated arbitration.” Id. at 837 (citing Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991)).
150. See Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts, supra note 1, at 1657–68.
151. According to a survey by FJC researcher Donna J. Stienstra, 2799 cases had been
referred to arbitration in her review of forty-nine federal district courts in one year, ending
June 30, 2011; the District of New Jersey recorded 1668 court-annexed arbitrations, and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania listed 826 court-annexed arbitrations. See DONNA
STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN INITIAL
REPORT 15, app. 17, 23–24 (2011), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012
/ADR2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/NS2J-WRSF].
152. The districts with more frequent use were the District of New Jersey, Eastern
District of New York, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; in others where formal
programs remained, almost none took place. See Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in
Courts, supra note 1, at 1661 n.133.
153. Id. at 1661–62, 1662 nn.134–35.
154. Those proceedings were in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See id. at 1661
n.133.
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designed to resolve civil disputes by utilizing a neutral third party.”155
When creating the program, the state’s legislature required
evaluations of its “effectiveness” to be reported annually.156
According to staff at the state’s clerk’s office, the arbitrations are held
in courthouses or other buildings, and the proceedings are open to the
public.157 Outcomes become part of a court-created database.158
These open practices are not idiosyncratic innovations. Public
access to arbitrations is part of a long tradition, reflected in
documents on English arbitrations dating from pre-Roman Britannia
through the Elizabethan Age, that gave third-party arbitrators
authority to resolve disputes and included public access to many
proceedings.159 So too did arbitrations in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries in the United States. Historians have identified
examples of arbitrations conducted like trials, albeit without juries,
and many proceedings included spectators.160 Moreover, twentieth-

155. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY
ARBITRATION 1 (2011), http://www.state.il.us/court/Administrative/ManArb/2011
/ManArbRpt11.pdf [http://perma.cc/9FDM-BK9H]. Illinois’s mandatory arbitration is akin
to abbreviated trials. As of 2011, 41,302 cases were referred to arbitration, about threequarters were settled or dismissed prior to arbitration, and about 600 of those that did
arbitrate proceeded from arbitration to trial. See id. at 5.
156. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1008A (West 2011), repealed by Act of August 24,
2012, Pub. Act No. 97-1099, § 10, 2012 Ill. Laws 5652. Separate reporting is no longer
required; data on the number of arbitrations have become part of the annual reports. See
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS:
STATISTICAL SUMMARY 101 (2015), http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/SupremeCourt
/AnnualReport/2015/2015_Statistical_Summary.pdf [http://perma.cc/RWF3-8B9J]; Telephone
Interview with Staff, Admin. Office of the Ill. Courts (Nov. 24, 2014).
157. See Arbitrator’s Bench Book, DU PAGE CTY., ILL., EIGHTEENTH JUD. CIR. 14 (3d
rev. 2011), http://www.dupageco.org/Courts/Docs/34145 [https://perma.cc/QU4J-7KWD].
In October of 2017, I reconfirmed with staff at the Administrative Office of the Illinois
Courts that arbitrations are open to the public. Telephone Interview with Staff, Admin.
Office of the Ill. Courts (Oct. 2017).
158. Posted reports from 2004 to 2011 can be found on the Illinois courts’ websites. See
COURTS,
Court-Annexed
Mandatory
Arbitration
Annual
Reports,
ILL.
http://www.state.il.us/court/Administrative/ManArb/default.asp
[http://perma.cc/L984J7VJ]. The numbers reported in the 2015 calendar year report were that 26,880 cases were
referred or pending and that 4,527 arbitration hearings were held, with 326 cases
thereafter proceeding to trial. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, supra note 156, at
101.
159. See DEREK ROEBUCK, EARLY ENGLISH ARBITRATION 226–30 (2008); DEREK
ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER
ELIZABETH I, at 116, 142 (2015).
160. Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 468 (1984); AMALIA KESSLER, INVENTING
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL
REGIME, 1800-1877, at 191–92 (2017); James Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in
America: The Early History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 241, 246–51 (2013).
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century labor arbitrations, embedded in collective bargaining
agreements and committed to social justice ends, were not only
publicly enabled, but also produced contractual agreements that were
accessible to the public.161
Thus, although today’s purveyors of arbitration aim to make
confidentiality its hallmark, arbitration has a history that includes
some publicly accessible proceedings. But contemporary legal rules
and practices have generated structures of privatization that aim to
make arbitration appear to be “naturally” closed as if, whether
involving commercial differences between two corporations or
between consumers and manufacturers, privacy is requisite. Yet,
when Congress in 1925 enacted what has come to be called the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”),162 it provided windows into the
decisions rendered by locating enforcement proceedings in public
courts. While motions seeking to vacate arbitrations are a small
fraction of federal court case filings, the statutory structure does not
shield them from public scrutiny.163 Rather, if seeking to vacate,
confirm, or modify awards, parties must file information on the
arbitrations.164 Thus, the FAA itself “appears to presume that
arbitration materials could become public.”165
Likewise, the 2000 Uniform Arbitration Act does not propose
that state statutes include confidentiality mandates. Rather, a
comment on judicial enforcement of arbitral awards reminds users
that “[b]ecause of the involvement of important legal rights, a court

161. See Amalia D. Kessler, The Public Roots of Private Ordering: An Institutional
Account of the Origins of Modern American Arbitration 9–10 (Aug. 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
162. See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, § 4, 43 Stat. 883, 883 (1925)
(codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012)); Resnik, The Contingency of Openness
in Courts, supra note 1, at 1675–76.
163. One analysis of motions filed from 2011 to 2014 identified 294 motions to vacate.
See Diana Li, Vacatur of Arbitral Awards: An Empirical Study of Access to Federal Court
Review 18 (May 25, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
164. See 9 U.S.C. § 13 (2012); see also PDV Sweeny, Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co., No.
14-cv-5183, 2014 WL 4979316, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2014) (concluding that arbitral
award actions are “judicial documents” that are presumptively open); Martis v. Dish
Network, No. 1:13-cv-1106, 2013 WL 6002208, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2013) (same).
165. Richard Frankel, State Court Authority Regarding Forced Arbitration After
Concepcion, in POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INST., FORCED ARBITRATIONS AND THE FATE OF
THE 7TH AMENDMENT: THE CORE OF AMERICA’S LEGAL SYSTEM AT STAKE? 55, 70
(2014), http://www.poundinstitute.org/sites/default/files/docs/2014PoundReport2.24.15.pdf
[http://perma.cc/MFQ9-VQKW].
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should review more carefully claims of confidentiality, trade secrets,
privilege, or other matters protected from disclosure.”166
The contemporary aura of privacy that shrouds arbitration comes
in part from the FAA’s history: its purpose was to enable businesses
to avoid courts.167 The idea was that bespoke contracts could specify
the terms, including requiring confidentiality. The FAA’s major
proponents—the American Arbitration Association (“AAA,”
founded in 1925) and the New York Chamber of Commerce—argued
the virtues of privacy for commercial actors.168
Since 1925, the AAA has been a dominant provider of services
and has helped to shape the presumption of confidentiality. The
AAA’s lists of arbitrators are not in a public directory.169 Further, in
its ethics code, the AAA commits the organization and arbitrators
working at its behest to keep information that they obtain private.170
166. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 18 cmt. 1 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). As of 2017,
the revised uniform law has been adopted by nineteen jurisdictions and introduced in four
more jurisdictions. See Arbitration Act (2000), UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000) [http://perma.cc
/X6DW-5HXH].
167. See Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on S.
1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong., 11 (1924) (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer, Chairman,
Committee on Arbitration, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York); H.R. REP.
NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924).
168. See FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS
AND ACHIEVEMENTS 10, 26–27 (1948).
169. See The AAA National Roster of Arbitrators and Mediators, AM. ARBITRATION
ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa-panel [http://perma.cc/5A8C-68ZX]. Public access to
information about AAA arbitrators is available only when seeking to select arbitrators.
See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AAA ARBITRATOR SELECT [hereinafter AAA Arbitrator
Select], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA_Arbitrator_Select
_2pg.pdf [http://perma.cc/FL9H-33US] (explaining how, after a party “completes a
detailed filing form . . . [t]he AAA provides a list of arbitrators whose credentials best
match the criteria specified” by a party on a detailed filing form). A party choosing the
“list only” service fills out a two-page form in which the party can indicate the dollar
amounts of the claim and counterclaim if any; the nature of the dispute; and the “desired
qualifications for arbitrator(s).” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, REQUEST FOR ARBITRATOR
SELECT: LIST ONLY, https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Request%20for%20Arbitrator
%20Select%20List%20only.pdf [http://perma.cc/E293-3A64].
The AAA then provides lists of sets of arbitrators and their fees (ranging from
$750, $1,500 to $2,000). AAA Arbitrator Select, supra. Searching and selection comes with
a service charge of $500 for each arbitrator appointed. Id. In addition, state laws seeking
information on arbitration providers offer another route to information, as do some
federal regulations. See infra notes 229–49 and accompanying text. Those entities in
compliance provide spreadsheets on which the names of arbitrators can be found. See, e.g.,
Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N (2015), https://www.adr.org
/sites/default/files/document_repository/ConsumerReportQ3_2017.xlsx
[https://perma.cc/RK3L-D46V].
170. Arbitrators working under the AAA adhere to its code of ethics. For example, the
Commercial Disputes Ethics Code provides: the “arbitrator should keep confidential all
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Watching the process is not, under current rules, an option, but, in
recent years, the AAA has published (through LexisNexis and
Westlaw) redacted versions of some decisions, which are termed
“awards.”171 Other major domestic arbitration providers advertise
confidentiality as a signature of their processes. Their hearings are
generally closed, and their rules permit arbitrators to bar third parties
from attending hearings.172
But a distinction needs to be drawn between what information
arbitrators and institutional providers can (or should) disclose and
what parties can say about what happened to them. In the context of
arbitrations imposed on consumers and employees by the providers of
goods, services, and jobs,173 some repeat players have unilaterally
sought to insist on secrecy.174
matters relating to the arbitration proceedings and decision.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES 7 (2004),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/Commercial_Code_of_Ethics_for
_Arbitrators_2010_10_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD5U-RLNT]; see also AAA Statement of
ARBITRATION
ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/
Ethical
Principles,
AM.
StatementofEthicalPrinciples [https://perma.cc/RZZ8-BYYA].
171. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL:
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE 27–28 (1998) [hereinafter AAA Consumer Due Process], https://www.adr.org
/sites/default/files/document_repository/Consumer%20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pdf
[https://perma.cc/NG35-LX4B] (“Unlike court proceedings, however, the general public
has not right to attend arbitration proceedings; if the parties agree, moreover, attendance
at hearings may be severely restricted.”). For publication, see, for example, Search of
Arbitral Awards Database, LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com (type “AAA
Employment Arbitration Awards” or “AAA Labor Arbitration Awards” into search bar
to access those collections); see also AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER
ARBITRATION RULES 28 (2016) [hereinafter AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules],
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZXD5J8Q5] (“The AAA may choose to publish an award rendered under these Rules; however,
the names of the parties and witnesses will be removed from awards that are published,
unless a party agrees in writing to have its name included in the award.).
172. JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION
& MGMT. SERVS. (July 1, 2014), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration
/#Rule%2026 [http://perma.cc/45KY-C2PZ] (limiting public access to proceedings before
the Judicial Arbitration and Management Services); Rules of Conditionally Binding
Arbitration, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/bbb-dispute-handling-andresolution/dispute-resolution-rules-and-brochures/rules-of-conditionally-binding-arbitration/
[http://perma.cc/E7TW-KHE7] (“It is our policy that records of the dispute resolution
process are private and confidential.”).
173. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2872–73; Erin O’Hara O’Connor,
Protecting Consumer Data Privacy with Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 711, 713–14, 730–31
(2018); Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679,
703–07 (2018).
174. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2895. The use of such clauses is
also the subject of Christopher R. Drahozal, Confidentiality in Consumer and Employment
Arbitration, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 28, 42–47 (2015).
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Before turning to the legality of such rules, the question to be
asked is why they exist. The model arbitration for the FAA was a
business-to-business transaction, in which the argument for
confidentiality rested on ideas that the participants were both repeat
players and that public conflicts would make future dealings more
difficult or costly. But when a repeat player is in conflict with a oneshot actor (for example, when a wireless service provider is
challenged on billing by a customer), the only privacy interest is a
provider’s desire not to have other similarly-situated consumers know
of the harms alleged, the positions taken, or the remedies accorded.
That one-sidedness prompted some courts to reject enforcement
of confidentiality clauses and, at times, of the arbitration mandates in
which they were embedded.175 But more recent case law, while
acknowledging that repeat players gain asymmetrical knowledge,
condones such practices, sometimes by noting (without any data) that
the advantages derived are not so significant as to bar their use.
An example of a secrecy provision comes from a clause imposed
in 2002 (and since withdrawn) by AT&T instructing that: “Neither
you nor [the company] may disclose the existence, content or results
of any arbitration or award, except as may be required by law or to
confirm and enforce an award.”176 In 2003, the Ninth Circuit held that
text unconscionable because, while “facially neutral, confidentiality
provisions usually favor companies over individuals,” AT&T could
ensure that “none of its potential opponents have access to
precedent” that AT&T had.177 In contrast, other circuits did not find
175. Examples of rulings that arbitration clauses remain enforceable even with
confidentiality requirements and that question of the enforceability of confidentiality itself
goes at least initially to arbitrators include Borgarding v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. CV
16-2485 (RAOx), 2016 WL 8904413, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2016) (citing Kilgore v.
KeyBank, 718 F.3d 1052, 1059 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)) and Velazquez v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., No. 13CV680-WQH-DHB, 2013 WL 4525581, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26,
2013) (citing Kilgore v. KeyBank, 718 F.3d 1052, 1059 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)).
176. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003).
177. Id. at 1151–52. The Ninth Circuit in Pokorny v. Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987 (9th
Cir. 2010), found unenforceable ADR provisions, including those requiring
confidentiality, where they created one-sided advantages; “while handicapping the
Plaintiffs’ ability to investigate their claims and engage in meaningful discovery, the
confidentiality provision does nothing to prevent [the defendant] from using its continuous
involvement in the [dispute resolution] process to accumulate a ‘wealth of knowledge’ on
how to arbitrate future claims.” Id. at 1002 (quoting Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152); see also
Narayan v. Ritz-Carlton Dev. Co., 400 P.3d 544, 555 (Haw. 2017); Schnuerle v. Insight
Commc’ns Co., 376 S.W.3d 561, 578–79 (Ky. 2012); McKee v. AT&T, 191 P.3d 845, 858–59
(Wash. 2008); Zuver v. Airtouch Commc’ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 764–65 (Wash. 2004).
Ninth Circuit case law was modified by the ruling in Kilgore v. KeyBank, 718 F.3d 1052
(9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The decision concluded that the existence of a confidentiality
clause in itself was not a sufficient basis for avoiding the obligation to arbitrate. Id. at 1058.
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such provisions objectionable.178 Some of those decisions posited that
arbitration was itself ordinarily private. As one court wrote,
“confidentiality clauses are so common in the arbitration context”
that court-imposed limits on confidentiality would undermine the
“character of arbitration itself.”179
In 2017, the Ninth Circuit returned to the question, prompted in
part by shifts in California law, and the Circuit tempered its prior
constraints. Under the law as currently explained by a lower court,
“the risk of repeat-player advantage does not render unenforceable
an arbitration agreement containing a confidentiality clause.”180
Required, however, is that confidentiality provisions include an
“exception” that permitted parties (at least in theory) to negotiate
about confidentiality.181
How common are confidentiality clauses in arbitration
mandates? A 2015 study by the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (“CFPB”) examined samples of arbitration provisions in
credit-card documents issued from 2010 to 2012. The CFPB found
that some credit card markets (such as student loans) imposed

The ruling generally shifted decision-making power on the validity of confidentiality
clauses from courts to arbitrators. Id. at 1059 n.9. The ability of states to use doctrines of
unconscionable contracts to limit confidentiality remains, but is constrained by Supreme
Court case law closely examining the basis for denying enforcement of arbitration
obligations to determine whether the state courts have failed to follow its edicts on the
scope of the FAA. See Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426
(2017); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013).
178. See Guyden v. Aetna Inc., 544 F.3d 376, 384–85 (2d Cir. 2008); Iberia Credit
Bureau Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, 379 F.3d 159, 175–76 (5th Cir. 2004); Parilla v. IAP
Worldwide Serv., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 279–81 (3d Cir. 2004); see also African Methodist
Episcopal Church, Inc. v. Smith, 217 So. 3d 816, 825–26 (Ala. 2016). A court concluded
that a for-profit educational service could seek an injunction against former students to
prevent them from disclosing the outcomes of arbitration. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Arce,
533 F.3d 342, 348–49 (5th Cir. 2008).
179. Guyden, 544 F.3d at 385 (quoting Iberia Credit Bureau, 379 F.3d at 175).
180. Herrera v. CarMax Auto Superstores Cal., LLC, No. CV–14–776–MWF (VBKx),
2014 WL 3398363, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2014) (citing Sanchez v. CarMax Auto
Superstores California, LLC, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 481–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014)).
181. See Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1266 (9th. Cir. 2017) (citing
Sanchez v. CarMax Auto Superstores California, LLC, 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 481–82 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014)). A district court thereafter drew a distinction between clauses that had
such exceptions and those that did not; the court held that a confidentiality clause by a
national insurance plan that did not include options for its opponents was unenforceable.
Fox v. Vision Serv. Plan, No. 2:16-cv-2456, 2017 WL 735735, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24,
2017). As the judge explained, the insurer could “discipline doctors across the country”
but with the confidentiality provision, doctors would have no “access to any information”
about the treatment of other doctors using the same dispute resolution process. Id. In
contrast, the repeat player participated in all disputes and therefore had “access to
information and precedents set in other hearing.” Id.
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confidentiality more frequently than did wireless service providers,
which, during the time of the study, did not have such clauses.182
Yet many people (lawyers included) have come to assume that
they cannot disclose outcomes because they think arbitrations are
confidential. Institutional providers such as the AAA do not
discourage such impressions. Rather, the “AAA takes no position on
whether parties should or should not agree to keep the proceeding
and award confidential between themselves.”183
I have focused on the lower courts and not on doctrine from the
U.S. Supreme Court because it has not directly addressed
asymmetrical confidentiality mandates. But in the context of
discussing bans on class actions in arbitration,184 justices have
mentioned confidentiality as a desired attribute of arbitration that
could be undermined if class actions were permitted. The topic
emerged after the Court noted the potential for class arbitrations and
the AAA had promulgated rules to govern such proceedings. Those
rules commented that “[t]he presumption of privacy and
confidentiality” did not apply.185 In 2010, Justice Alito quoted that
provision as illustrative of the “fundamental changes” that class
arbitrations would impose on the proceedings.186 Likewise, Justice
Scalia noted in 2011 in his majority decision in AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion187 that confidentiality “becomes more difficult” with
class action arbitrations.188
IV. REPEAT PLAYERS, COSTS, AND THE IMPACT OF BANNING
COLLECTIVE ACTION
Taking steps to identify oneself as harmed and locating the
source are requisite to seeking redress; “naming, blaming, and

182. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 15, § 2, at 52.
183. AAA Statement of Ethical Principles, supra note 170.
184. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011). The
permissibility of bans on class actions in employment is pending before the Court in the
2017-2018 term. The question is whether the rights to collective actions under the National
Labor Relations Act are buffers against bans on class actions. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp.,
823 F.3d 1147, 1155–56 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Murphy Oil
USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d. 1013, 1019–20 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 809
(2017); see also Convergys Corp. v. NLRB, 866 F.3d 635, 637–39 (5th Cir. 2017).
185. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS
9(a) (2003), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lel-annualcle/08/materials/data/papers/018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EE25-VXX8].
186. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010).
187. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
188. Id. at 348.
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claiming” are difficult for individuals to do.189 Joining others makes it
easier to proceed. Class and other forms of collective actions provide
infusions of knowledge and resources, typically by way of lawyers.190
The legitimacy of the resolution of such representative actions hinges
on the formation of at least a nominal relationship among
representatives, courts, and absentees. Since 1966, in federal class
actions where damages are sought, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have insisted that notice be provided at certification of the
pendency of the claim.191 Although people often do not respond to
such notices,192 that mechanism forces the fact of a claim into public
view.193
This form of publicity is on the wane because of class action bans
in courts and in arbitration. The argument advanced in favor of the
preclusion of group-based claims is that individual arbitration
provides an “effective” alternative.194 As the lawyer for the Chamber
of Commerce, which opposed efforts in 2016 by the CFPB to limit
class action bans, put it: arbitration “empowers individuals, freeing
them from reliance on lawyers” and makes “dispute resolution easy
to access and claims easy to prosecute.”195 But, as my opening
discussion forecasts and as I detail below, the evidence available
points in the opposite direction: individual consumers do not use
arbitration.

189. Austin Sarat, Exploring the Hidden Domains of Civil Justice: "Naming, Blaming,
and Claiming" in Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 426–27 (2000).
190. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. C HI . L. R EV . 684, 685–87, 714–17 (1940).
191. See Resnik, “Vital” State Interests, supra note 11, at 1790.
192. See, e.g., Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class
Action Outcomes? Empirical Research on the Availability of Class Action Claims Data 7
(RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Working Paper No. WR-599-ICJ, 2008),
http://www.billrubenstein.com/Downloads/RAND%20Working%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc
/JX9W-EYQ9].
193. Rules for class arbitrations have been modeled after court class action rules, and
therefore, as Justice Scalia correctly observed in AT&T v. Concepcion, class actions—in
court or arbitration—make confidentiality “more difficult.” 563 U.S. at 348.
194. In the 1980s, as the U.S. Supreme Court expanded its interpretation of the reach
of the FAA, the Court launched the argument that arbitration was an “effective” means of
vindicating federal statutory rights in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). That decision was when the Court first applied the FAA to
preclude litigation of a federal statutory right. Id. at 637–38. For discussion of the
“adequacy” test’s application, evolution, and its limits, see Resnik, Diffusing Disputes,
supra note 1, at 2884–90.
195. Examining the CFPB’s Proposed Rulemaking on Arbitration: Is it in the Public
Interest and for the Protection of Consumers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts.
& Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 114th Cong. 4 (2016) (Statement
of Andrew Pincus, Partner, Mayer Brown LLP).
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A. The Rarity of Single-File Consumer Claims
To learn about evidence of “empowerment” through consumer
arbitration practices, the CFPB surveyed a three-year period in six
financial services markets involving tens of millions of customers.196
That research demonstrated that individuals infrequently bring claims
in arbitration; the CFPB located about 400 filings brought by
consumers in each of the three years studied.197
Another source of data comes from a few states that statutorily
require consumer-ADR providers to publish information on use.198
California’s statute, enacted in 2002 and amended in 2014, calls for
providers of arbitrations to make available information in “a
computer-searchable format” on the web.199 The information required
to be publicized under this law includes “each consumer arbitration”
196. See CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 15, at § 1.4.1, 9, § 1.4.3, 11.
197. The six markets were “credit card; checking account/debit cards; payday loans;
prepaid cards; private student loans; and auto loans.” Id. at § 1.4.3, 11.
198. Lexis and Westlaw also allow subscribers to search the texts of arbitral awards
provided by the AAA with some redactions. See, e.g., Search of Arbitral Awards Database,
LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com (type “AAA Employment Arbitration
Awards” or “AAA Labor Arbitration Awards” into search bar to access those
collections).
199. Act of Sept. 30, 2002, ch. 1158, sec. 1, § 1281.96(a), 2002 Cal. Stat. 7502, 7502
(codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West, Westlaw through
2017 Reg. Sess.)); Act of Sept. 30, 2014, ch. 870, sec. 1, § 1281.96(a), 2014 Cal. Stat. 5671,
5671 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a), (b) (West, Westlaw
through 2017 Reg. Sess.)) (originally enacted in 2002, effective 2003, and amended in
2014). Given that I gathered information initially for AAA filings in 2009–2013 and that its
reporting was governed by the mandates of California’s 2003 statute, the quoted
provisions in the text are from the 2003 version of the statute.
The 2014 statute made a few modifications. California required that “[t]he
information required by this section shall be made available in a format that allows the
public to search and sort the information using readily available software.” Act of Sept. 30,
2014, ch. 870, sec. 1, § 1281.96(b), 2014 Cal. Stat. at 5672. Furthermore, the 2014 statute
mandated that data are to be “directly accessible from a conspicuously displayed link.” Id.
The statute—in 2003 and in 2014—also requires that paper copies be provided upon
request, exempts companies doing fewer than fifty yearly consumer arbitrations from webbased quarterly reporting and protects companies from liability for providing the
information. See Cal. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a), (c)(2), (e); Act of Sept. 30, 2014, ch.
1158, sec. 1, §1281.96(a), (c)(2), (3), 2014 Cal. Stat. at 5671–5672; Act of Sept. 30, 2002, ch.
1158, sec. 1, § 1281.96(b)(1)–(2), (d) 2002 Cal. Stat. at 7502–03. The 2014 amendment
added additional disclosure requirements, including whether “arbitration was demanded
pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration clause and, if so, whether the pre-dispute arbitration
clause designated the administering arbitration company.” Act of Sept. 30, 2014, ch. 870,
sec. 1, § 1281.96(a)(1), 2014 Cal. Stat. at 5671.
Maryland, Maine, and the District of Columbia enacted similar provisions after
California’s 2002 enactments. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-4430 (West, Westlaw through
Dec. 12, 2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1394 (West, Westlaw through 2017 First
Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3903 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg.
Sess.).
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(including the name of non-consumer parties who are corporations or
other business entities); the “type of dispute” (by wage brackets for
employees); whether an attorney represented the consumer; the time
from when a demand to arbitrate was made until disposition; the
mode of disposition (“withdrawal, abandonment, settlement, award
after hearing, award without hearing, default, or dismissal without
hearing”); the prevailing party; the amount sought; the amount
awarded and other relief provided; and the arbitrator’s name, fee, and
the fee’s allocation among the parties.200
Not all providers comply with California’s mandate. According
to a 2013 study, Reporting Consumer Arbitration Data in California,
eleven of the twenty-six entities identified as arbitration providers
filed some––but not all––of the required information.201 A 2017
follow-up reported that thirty-two entities offered consumer
arbitration services, eleven (about one-third) posted some data, and
three met all the formal requirements of California’s law202 One of
those providers largely in compliance was the American Arbitration
Association, which puts “Consumer Arbitration Statistics” on its
webpage and states that the data are “updated on a quarterly basis, as
required by law.”203 The AAA is also the designated dispute
resolution provider for AT&T.204 Because I wanted to learn about
how much consumers used single-file arbitration, I focused on AT&T,
which had succeeded in the Supreme Court when arguing that its ban
on collective actions was enforceable under the FAA. Working with
200. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (Westlaw).
201. DAVID J. JUNG, JAMIE HOROWITZ, JOSE HERRERA & LEE ROSENBERG, PUB.
LAW RESEARCH INST., REPORTING CONSUMER ARBITRATION DATA IN CALIFORNIA:
AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 1281.96, at 9–12, 52–53 (2013), http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitration-report/2014arbitration-update [http://perma.cc/9M5X-8LH2]. The remaining fifteen companies did
not publish any disclosure report on their websites. Id. at 10.
202. PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., U.C. HASTINGS COLL. OF THE LAW, ARBITRATION
REPORTING IN CALIFORNIA: COMPLIANCE WITH CCP §1281.96, at 4 (2017),
http://carsfoundation.org/pdf/arbitration_UC-Hastings-report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc
/W8CB-TAVY]. Those three were ADR Services, Arts Arbitration and Mediation
Services (“AAMS”), and JAMS. Id. at 6.
203. Consumer and Employment Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/ConsumerArbitrationStatistics
[https://perma.cc/JC67-SUMZ]
[hereinafter AAA Consumer Arbitration Statistics]. The 2017 Hastings Report described
the AAA as a “good,” in that it complied with much of the substance of the California
requirements in 2017, but that study did not list the AAA as one of the top three
compliant providers because the AAA’s website did not use some of the statutory
language, which makes web-based searches more difficult. See PUB. LAW RESEARCH
INST., supra note 202, at 24.
204. See Resolve a Dispute with AT&T via Arbitration, AT&T, https://www.att.com
/esupport/article.html#!/wireless/KM1045585 [https://perma.cc/2PXP-XE8R].
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adept and thoughtful research assistants, we culled the data that
AAA posted on its website to learn about claims brought against or
by AT&T.
Before detailing the results, caveats are in order. A first
limitation is the absence of access to the underlying materials, which
are held privately. As the AAA explains, it does not independently
verify what arbitrators report to it.205 A second problem is that coding
errors can occur at both individual and aggregate levels. For example,
when researching consumer arbitration between 2015 and 2016, we
identified sixty-two cases in the set that were described as seeking the
same amount ($607,525.40) and in which each consumer was listed as
having received the same award ($585.71). AAA research staff
responded to our inquiries, identified a computer coding error
affecting these cases as well as other cases, and posted corrected data.
But no red flags told other researchers that the data had been
corrected.206 While a vivid example of a potential error may be found
through culling thousands of entries and then seeking clarification,
the general public has no systematic method of checking the accuracy
of the data posted by AAA.
Of course, researchers on court-based information know well
that such data are neither pristine nor comprehensive. For example,
lawyers in the federal system fill out civil cover sheets that require the
selection of a single cause of action for each case filed.207 Yet those of
us who write complaints regularly plead more than one legal basis on
which to proceed. Further, searching the electronic database to learn
about rulings at different phases of cases is challenging.208 Moreover,
in the federal system, access to the electronic system is costly unless
individuals or organizations fit the categories for lower charges or
205. See AAA Consumer Arbitration Statistics, supra note 203 (“Any ‘prevailing party’
information contained with this website/document, has been provided solely by the
arbitrator(s) to an arbitration. The AAA has not reviewed, investigated, or evaluated the
accuracy or completeness of the arbitrator’s/arbitrators’ determination of the ‘prevailing
party’ and makes no representations regarding the accuracy or completeness of this
information.”). The AAA has upon occasion opened its own files to researchers.
206. Email from Ryan Boyle, Vice President, Statistics & In-House Research, Am.
Arbitration Ass’n, to Judith Resnik (Sept. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Sept. 2017 Email from
Ryan Boyle] (on file with author).
(2017),
207. Civil
Cover
Sheet,
JS
44,
U.S.
COURTS
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/js_044_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9MJ-ZW9E].
208. See ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 145–48 (2017); Deborah R.
Hensler, Happy 50th Anniversary, Rule 23! Shouldn’t We Know You Better After All this
Time?, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1620–21 (2017); Miguel de Figueiredo, Alexandra D.
Lahav & Peter Siegelman, Do Judges Respond to Incentives? The Effects of the Six
Month List 15–16 (Feb. 20, 2018) (unpublished draft), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2989777
[https://perma.cc/S2SZ-PT7A].
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exemptions. Filings related to administrative adjudication raise yet
other problems, as no comprehensive database hosts the materials.209
Nonetheless, because court records are presumptively public, thirdparties have the possibility of looking at the underlying materials.
The arbitration statistics reported here have, therefore, to be
read with an appreciation for the potential for errors and
incompleteness. Our work with these materials entailed two data
pulls, one focused on July of 2009 to June of 2014 and a second, on
information about the period between July of 2014 and June of 2017.
Using the same methodology, we looked at thousands of AAAposted inputs on individual consumer claims, some of which related to
the same case; we excluded claims related to real estate and
construction.210 Between July of 2009 and June of 2014, we identified
a total of 134 claims against AT&T, or an average of 27 per year
brought by consumers.211 During that same time period, AT&T had
between 85 and 120 million customers. By 2016, AT&T’s customer
base had grown to some 147 million.212 The 2014-2017 review
identified 316 claims against AT&T (or 105 per year) closed in the
three years ending June of 2017.213

209. DANIEL J. SHEFFNER, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE
MATERIALS ON AGENCY WEBSITES, DRAFT REPORT 3–4 (2017), https://www.acus.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/Adjudication%20Materials%20on%20Agency%20Websites%20
%28March%206%2C%202017%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW88-VART].
210. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2899. For the 2009 through 2014
period, we looked at the list of 17,368 individual claims (sometimes related to the same
case). By, as noted, excluding real estate and construction, we identified 7,303 (or fortytwo percent) as in the consumer category. Of the 5,224 claims “terminated by an award,”
about half included a dollar figure. For the 2014 to 2017 timeframe, and deleting the
overlap in 2012-2014, we looked at the list of 13,648 individual claims (again sometimes
related to the same case). Again excluding real estate and construction, we identified 6,477
(or forty-seven percent) as in the consumer category.
Of the 2,545 claims “terminated by an award,” about forty-five percent included a
dollar figure. A bit more than half of those awards (twenty-four percent) went to
consumers, and twenty-one percent to companies.
211. Id. at 2812.
212. See AT&T INC., 2016 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2017), https://investors.att.com/~
/media/Files/A/ATT-IR/financial-reports/annual-reports/2016/att-ar2016-completeannualreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5F24-SYSJ].
213. These data come from two AAA datasets, the first covering complaints closed
between July 2009 and June 2014 and the second covering complaints closed between July
2012 and June 2017. We then looked to cases to which AT&T (and any of the variations in
its name and corporate form) was a party. Overlapping time periods were deleted from
the second dataset. The caveat is that there were minor differences when information
overlapped on claims in 2012-2014, and in those instances, we used the earlier posted data.
Both datasets are on file with the author [hereinafter AAA Data, July 2009-June 2017].
The July 2009-June 2017 data, as posted by the AAA and including additional
quarters posted thereafter, can also be found at Yale Law School Consumer Arbitration

96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018)

2018]

OPEN COURTS AND ARBITRATIONS

651

A few details illustrate the kinds of information available and
the limits of the coded information. In the 316 cases in which AT&T
was involved between 2014-2017, thirty-nine were described as ending
in decisions, called “awards,” 251 settled, and twenty-six fell under
the categories of “administrative,” “dismissed,” or “withdrawn.”214
Within the thirty-nine “awarded” cases, twenty-two involved
instances when AT&T “prevailed.” Of those cases, in three,
consumers were to pay the company in amounts ranging from $566 to
$2103. In the other seventeen cases that ended in awards, the AAA
compilation listed “zero” as funds that would be ordered paid; in nine
instances, the compilation listed no party prevailing. In one case, no
party was listed as prevailing, but the consumer was described as
receiving a positive award.215 Counting this case along with the other
seven claims in which consumers were listed as prevailing, these eight
consumer awards ranged from $2.23 to $1,449, with a median of
$525.36.216
A summary comes by way of bringing the two data sets together
in Figure 1, Consumer Arbitration Filings with the American
Arbitration Association. As that Figure shows, during the course of
eight years, an average of fewer than sixty people a year sought relief
for claims against AT&T by using the individual arbitration system
mandated.
Data Archive, Consumer Arbitrations with The American Arbitration Association 2009 to
Present, OPEN SCI. FRAMEWORK, https://osf.io/qmtsu/ [https://perma.cc/4PYT-79P8]. This
website has been constructed to enable ongoing preservation of AAA data in light of the
AAA practice of taking down a quarter of data every time a new quarter is posted given
that the California statute requires that only five years of data be made public.
The data from 2009–2014 did not include a set of 1,148 claims against AT&T filed
between 2011 and 2012 by one law firm, of which 1,093 were filed on one day. Another
fifty-three were filed during the preceding fifteen months and two were filed in the
subsequent month. After discussions with lawyers at that firm, it became clear that its
filings did not fit the model of individual, single-file cases that both AT&T and the U.S.
Supreme Court had extolled. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2901 n.480.
The numbers that we identified comport with information reported by AT&T to
Senators Al Franken, Richard Blumenthal, Ron Wyden, Patrick Leahy, and Edward J.
Markey in 2017. Letter from Timothy P. McKone, Exec. Vice President Fed. Relations,
AT&T Servs., Inc., to Sen. Al Franken, Sen. Richard Blumenthal, Sen. Ron Wyden, Sen.
Patrick Leahy & Sen. Edward J. Markey, U.S. Senate 6 (June 30, 2017),
https://www.franken.senate.gov/files/letter/170630ATTResponseLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc
/87JT-J48V] [hereinafter AT&T letter to U.S. Senators] (“412 arbitrations have been
commenced since the beginning of 2015; most were settled before hearing, just as the vast
majority of court cases are resolved before trial.”).
214. AAA Data, July 2009-June 2017, supra note 213. The focus was on cases closed
between July 2014 and June 2017.
215. Id. These details provide examples of the “noise” in the statistical compilations
posted on the AAA website.
216. Id.
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Figure 1
Figure 1 also includes information garnered by the CFPB,
which relied on AAA-posted data, as we did. The CFPB’s findings
confirm that a focus on AT&T did not produce an idiosyncratic
result. Millions upon millions of people have credit cards of varying
kinds, and about 104 per year seek redress through single-file
arbitration. In short, almost no one turns to the self-proclaimed
“effective” method of redress that companies have imposed.
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Under some arbitration mandates, including AT&T’s,
individuals could also use small claims courts,217 but again only singlefile.218 As I recounted in Diffusing Disputes, we sought to gather some
information on filings in small claims courts from 2010 to 2014. To do
so, we selected two jurisdictions, California and Illinois; in both,
several counties provided free online information about small claims
court filings.219 In California, where accessible databases came from
twenty-five of its fifty-eight counties (just under a third of the state’s
population), we identified sixty-six cases in fifteen counties in which
AT&T was listed as a defendant and three in which it was a
plaintiff.220 During the same five-year period, we located 140 cases in
fourteen counties in Illinois that involved AT&T in breach of contract
or fraud cases.221
More recently, we tried a different approach by looking for
filings involving AT&T from July of 2009 through June of 2017 in the
five largest counties in the United States—Los Angeles and San
Diego counties, California; Maricopa County, Arizona; Cook County,
Illinois; and Harris County, Texas. In 2016, 27.5 million residents, or

217. The relevant documents during the 2009-2014 period are discussed in Diffusing
Disputes, supra note 1, at 2903 n.486. During the 2014-2017 period, AT&T also permitted
use of small claims court. See Service Agreement, AT&T, https://www.att.com/equipment
/legal/service-agreement.jsp?q_termsKey=postpaidServiceAgreement&q_termsName=Service
+Agreement [https://perma.cc/LB6B-2CXA]; Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T § 2.1
(2015), https://www.att.com/legal/terms.wirelessCustomerAgreement.html [https://perma.cc
/9XA6-E956]; see also File a Complaint, AT&T (2017), https://www.att.com/esupport
/article.html#!/wireless/KM1041856 [https://perma.cc/3ZQB-6EMW].
218. The CFPB also sought to understand the role played by small claims courts. The
CFPB looked at filings in 2012 and found that 870 consumers filed against credit issuers in
small claims court in a set of jurisdictions totaling about 85 million people; the CFPB
identified credit card issuers turning to courts repeatedly—eighty percent of 41,000
claims—for debt collection. CFPB 2015 ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 15, § 1, at 15–
16, § 7, at 11–12. The CFPB encountered the challenges we had in that a central database
for small claims courts does not exist, and access to data varies by jurisdictions. Id. § 7, at
5. Therefore, the CFPB only used information from states with databases that purported
to provide statewide data, permit searches by party name, and allow for sorting by date.
Id. § 7, at 5–6. The CFPB supplemented its statewide data with data from the thirty most
populous counties in the United States. Id. § 7, at 6.
219. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2903.
220. These counties were: Santa Clara, Ventura, Santa Cruz, Fresno, Stanislaus, Placer,
Kern, El Dorado, Contra Costa, San Joaquin, San Francisco, San Mateo, Monterey,
Marin, and Mendocino. Memorandum from Diana Li, Jonas Wang, John Giammatteo,
Marianna Mao, Ben Woodring & Chris Milione on Small Claims Court Filings: A
Preliminary Analysis, to Judith Resnik 3, 6 (Mar. 16, 2015) (on file with author).
221. Those counties were Cook, Lake, St. Clair, Vermilion, Clinton, LaSalle, DuPage,
Madison, Bard, Champaign, Winnebago, Macon, McHenry, and Jackson. Id. at 7–8.
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about 8.5% of the U.S. population, lived in these five counties.222
Between July 2009 and June 2017, by using the tools for online
searches provided by the counties, we identified 273 small claims
cases filed against AT&T and 10 filed by AT&T.223
222. These figures are calculated using the sum of the five counties’ populations in
2016, divided by the 2016 U.S. census population. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COUNTY
POPULATION TOTALS DATASETS: 2010–2016, (2017), https://www.census.gov/data
/datasets/2016/demo/popest/counties-total.html [https://perma.cc/6Y2Z-MLGU]; Quick
Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US
/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/EM5F-ML22].
223. The caveats are that we relied on using various versions of AT&T’s commonly
known corporate entities, put them into the text box provided, and sifted through the
results, and that the methods to do searches in counties were not identical. For example, in
Cook County, Maricopa County, and San Diego County, we were able to search for the
broad term “ATT,” and search the results. The search functions in these counties do not
accept the ampersand symbol. In Los Angeles County, using “AT&T” as a “party” alone
was too general for the system, and in Harris County, business name searches were
required to have at least eight characters. In these two counties, we therefore further
specified AT&T’s corporate entities by using “AT&T Corp.,” “AT&T Inc.,” “AT&T
Mobility,” “AT&T Communications,” and “AT&T Wireless.” We did not, for example,
search for all of the terms associated with the Bell Telephone Company. By doing what is
known as a follow-up sensitivity check after we had completed the searches, we know that
AT&T’s predecessor companies, “Illinois Bell” or “Southwest Bell,” may also have been
parties to cases. Thus, because of the search variables and because AT&T has over time
used different names, it is possible, and we think likely, that our research resulted in an
undercount of small claims cases.
The databases in counties varied in another respect. It was not always clear what
cases were “small claims” cases, and moreover, what value claims qualify as “small claims”
also varies by state and over time. To avoid more sources of an undercount, we were overinclusive. Thus, while Los Angeles County, Harris County, and San Diego County
explicitly identified cases as small claims, in Cook County we included all cases involving
contract disputes, consumer fraud disputes, or pro se litigants; in Maricopa County, we
included all civil claims.
Thereafter, we summed our results for each county during the relevant time
period. In Cook County, we identified at least 20 cases in which AT&T was the defendant
and at least 9 in which AT&T was the plaintiff. In Harris County, we identified seven cases
in which AT&T was the defendant, one in which it was the plaintiff, and one in which they
were the counter-plaintiff. In Los Angeles County, we identified at least 177 cases in which
AT&T was the defendant and no cases in which it was the plaintiff. In Maricopa County,
we located AT&T as the defendant 17 times and not a plaintiff in any case. In San Diego
County, we found that AT&T was the defendant in at least 52 cases and not a plaintiff in
any.
For more details, see Memorandum from Greg Conyers on AT&T Small Claims
Data in the Five Largest Counties in United States, to Judith Resnik (Jan. 22, 2017) (on
file with author). The underlying data are posted on the websites of each of the counties.
“Party Name Search,” The Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles,
https://www.lacourt.org/paonlineservices/civilindex/cipublicmain.aspx; “Electronic Full
Case Docket Search,” Clerk of the Circuit Court, Cook County, Illinois,
http://www.cookcountyclerkofcourt.org/?section=CASEINFOPage&CASEINFOPage=2400;
“Search For Your Case,” Justice of the Peace Courts, Harris County, Texas,
https://jpwebsite.harriscountytx.gov/FindMyCase/search.jsp; “Justice Court Case History,”
Maricopa County Justice Courts, http://justicecourts.maricopa.gov/FindACase/casehistory.aspx;
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This preliminary foray into trying to compare the use of small
claims court and arbitration suggests that, like arbitration, small
claims court filings are a rarity. A few individuals have pursued relief
in small claims courts against AT&T. As for claims brought by the
company, they are exceedingly unusual. The company has little
incentive to pursue small claimants in either arbitration or smallclaims court. In the sample we reviewed, AT&T can be found filing in
small claims court but not in its own, mandated arbitration system.224
Analysts of dispute resolution know well that filings are not the
best or the only metric of underlying disputes. Claims may not be
pursued for a host of reasons, as “lumping it” (doing nothing) is a
common response. Moreover, remedies may be available because
companies respond to complaints. Low filing rates could therefore
reflect inertia, that no legal claims are available, or that an opponent
is conciliatory when challenged.225 But as I detailed in Diffusing
Disputes,226 the federal and state governments pursued all the major
wireless service providers for overcharging customers in violation of
federal law and for failing to respond to customer requests for
reimbursements.227 These government filings against the wireless
companies illustrate the importance of collective action (in these
instances, governments as plaintiffs) to seeking redress.
That pursuit undermines an analysis that the miniscule number
of consumer-initiated claims came from a lack of legal bases for
bringing claims. Rather, the better explanation of what Cynthia
Estlund called “missing claims” in the employment context228 comes
“Party Name Search,” Superior Court of California, County of San Diego,
http://courtindex.sdcourt.ca.gov/CISPublic/namesearch.
224. As noted, we found ten claims initiated by AT&T in small claims courts. See supra
text accompanying note 223. We found no claims initiated by AT&T against consumers
during the 2009-2014 period in the AAA arbitration data, but AT&T did file a
counterclaim in one of the consumer-initiated claims. Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra
note 1, at 2902. According to the AAA data, AT&T did not initiate any claims in
arbitration in the subsequent three years. See AAA Data, July 2009-June 2017, supra note
213.
225. That is the view espoused by AT&T, as indicated by its letter to several U.S.
Senators. AT&T Letter to U.S. Senators, supra note 213, at 6. That letter argued that
“[m]any thousands of customers have used AT&T’s dispute resolution process to obtain
prompt, fair resolutions for their claims. The number of reported arbitration decisions is
small because only a relatively small number of cases are not settled, and actually proceed
to the arbitration process––and even fewer proceed to a final hearing, because they are
settled after the arbitration process as invoked.” Id.
226. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2908–2910.
227. See id. at 2909; see also Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary
Judgment at 2–3, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-3227-HLM (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8,
2014).
228. Estlund, supra note 173, at 712–18.

96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018)

656

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

from the practical difficulties of reading bills, ferreting out
overcharges, understanding and using the procedures, and paying
upfront costs. Moreover, the sums sought to be recouped in individual
cases are small compared to the energy required to seek relief. The
arbitration regimes imposed by repeat players on less well-resourced
litigants not only privatize process through diffusing claims to diverse
providers but also erase legal claims. Instead of a pathway to justice,
these obligatory programs have become barriers to publicity and to
obtaining relief.
B.

Assessing Fees and Providing Waivers

Arbitration and courts both charge users for services. Below, I
sketch some of the ways in which the dollars and cents of dispute
resolution—in both arbitration and courts—also limit access and are
another method by which public knowledge about disputes is being
lost.
In some jurisdictions, information about the costs of courtannexed arbitration is available to the public. In some programs,
parties have to pay separately (and sometimes privately) for
arbitrators; in others, the expenses of support for ADR programs are
borne by the court, whose personnel may also staff the programs.229 In
terms of the amounts, some courts regulate the charges of auxiliary
ADR providers. For example, in the federal system, the lawyers
serving as court-annexed arbitrators have fees capped at $150 to $250
per arbitration,230 and those sums are generally paid by the court.

229. See ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 10; Telephone
Interview with Staff, Admin. Office of the Ill. Courts (Oct. 24, 2017).
230. The Judicial Conference of the United States authorizes each district to set its
own rules on paying ADR neutrals. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 53 (1999)
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1999-09_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE9F-JP88]. In
the federal courts using court-annexed arbitration, several have written rules calling on the
“court” or the AO to compensate arbitrators. For example, the District of New Jersey
provides: “An arbitrator shall be compensated $250 for service in each case assigned for
arbitration. . . . [F]ees shall be paid by or pursuant to an order of the Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.” D. N.J. CIV. R. 201.1(c). Similarly, the
Eastern District of New York provides: “An arbitrator shall be compensated $250 for
services in each case. . . . [F]ees shall be paid by or pursuant to the order of the Court
subject to the limits set by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” E.D.N.Y. CIV. R.
83.7(b). The rule for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is: “The arbitrators shall be
compensated $150.00 each for services in each case assigned for arbitration. . . . [F]ees
shall be paid by or pursuant to the order of the director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.” E.D. PA. CIV. R. 53.2(2). The limited fees paid may have an effect
on the place in which arbitrations are held; convening the proceeding in a lawyer’s office is
likely time-saving for the arbitrator, even as it makes public access to the proceeding
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Special assessments are another route to funding. Illinois charges
each civil litigant eight to ten dollars on top of other fees to cover the
costs of its court-annexed arbitrators and the program’s
administration.231
Learning about the costs of privately-based arbitration is
difficult. Two sets of fees exist, those charged by the arbitrators and
those imposed by the entity that administers the arbitration, which
can include (as the AAA does) fees for obtaining access to lists of
arbitrators.
Depending on the arbitration market, fees paid to arbitrators can
range from a few hundred dollars to tens of thousands of dollars daily.
For example, the AAA’s Consumer Arbitration Rules provide that
arbitrators dealing with “a case with an in-person or telephonic
hearing” are to receive $1,500 per day; the rate for document-only
arbitrations is $750 per case.232 Information about the charges
imposed by other providers comes from case law, such as a decision
finding unenforceable an obligation to arbitrate that was imposed on
mobile home owners renting land in California.233 The court described
JAMS, another major provider, as charging a fee of “$5,000 to
$10,000 fee for each day of arbitration”; half of the sums were—under
provisions in the rental documents that the court found
unenforceable, half of the sums were to have been paid in advance by
the mobile home owners.234 In contrast, if one makes it into court,
judges are “free” in the sense that their salaries are paid by the
governments that employ them.
As for administration fees, in 2013, the AAA instituted a
consumer filing fee of $200, confirmed again in 2016; business parties
are charged $1,700.235 The AAA states that, as a condition of its
services, consumers and employees are not to be charged the fees for
functionally implausible. See Memorandum from Jason Bertoldi on Compensating ADR
Neutrals in the Federal Courts to Judith Resnik 5 (Mar. 3, 2015) (on file with author).
231. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1009A (West, Westlaw through P.A. 100-576 of
the 2018 Reg. Sess.).
232. AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 171, at 34.
233. Penilla v. Westmont Corp., 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
234. Id. at 480, 485.
235. AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 171, at 33; see also American
Arbitration Association (AAA) Consumer Dispute Documents Pre-September 2014, AM. ARBITRATION
ASS’N, https://archive.org/stream/ConsumerRelatedDisputesSupplementaryPROCEDURES
/Consumer-Related%20Disputes%20Supplementary%20PROCEDURES_djvu.txt
[https://perma.cc/93WJ-F5B7]. If the claim is withdrawn within thirty days of filing, the
business party received a refund of half its filing fee. Consumer Arbitration Fact Sheet,
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://info.adr.org/consumer-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc
/AMC6-UZTZ].
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arbitrators; the AAA had capped that requirement at $75,000 and
thereafter removed the cap.236 Filing fees may, at the option of the
provider or under the documents mandating use of alternative
processes, sometimes be recouped at the conclusion of the proceeding
through fee-shifting.237
Limits on private-sector ADR charges can come from selfimposed constraints. For example, the AAA’s Consumer Due Process
Protocol calls for costs to be “reasonable.”238 Limits can also come
through lawyers and providers enhancing access through pro bono
programs239 and by way of regulation either through statutes or
judicial decisions finding arbitration obligations unenforceable
because of the fees imposed.240
One route to capping arbitration expenses could have come from
interpreting the FAA as licensing the enforcement of obligations to
arbitrate only if the process was accessible, measured in part in terms
of fees. But in 2000, in the 5-4 decision of Green Tree Financial Corp.
v. Randolph,241 the U.S. Supreme Court placed the burden on the
opponent of arbitration to demonstrate its excessive costs.242 In 2013,
236. Telephone Interview with Ryan Boyle, Vice President for Statistics & In-House
Research, Am. Arbitration Ass’n (Jan. 26, 2018). The rules provide that the “business
shall pay the arbitrator’s compensation unless the consumer, post dispute, voluntarily
elects to pay a portion of the arbitrator’s compensation.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N,
CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES: SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES 12 (2013),
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer-Related%20Disputes%20Supplementary
%20Procedures%20Sep%2015%2C%202005.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JGE-WA6C].
237. The AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules provide that the “filing fee must be paid
before a matter is considered properly filed. If the court order directs that a specific party
is responsible for the filing fee, it is the responsibility of the filing party either to make
such payment to the AAA and seek reimbursement as directed in the court order or to
make other such arrangements so that the filing fee is submitted to the AAA with the
Demand.” AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES 34 (2016) [hereinafter AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules],
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QQKRWU2]. Moreover, the Consumer Arbitration Rules discuss “nonrefundable” filing fees.
AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, supra note 171, at 33–34. Whether one side of the
dispute reimburses the other depends on the documents governing the specific arbitration,
as referenced in the Consumer Rules, which state that in “cases before a single arbitrator,
a nonrefundable filing fee capped in the amount of $200 is payable in full by the consumer
when a case is filed, unless the parties’ agreement provides that the consumer pay less.” Id.
at 34.
238. AAA Consumer Due Process, supra note 171, at 2.
239. See, e.g., Jerome B. Simandle, Enhancing Access to ADR for Unrepresented
Litigants: Federal Court Programs Provide Models for Helping Pro Se Parties––and the
Justice System, 22 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2016, at 6, 8–10.
240. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017
Reg. Sess.).
241. 31 U.S. 79 (2000).
242. Id. at 91–92.
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the Court (again 5-4) reiterated that approach in American Express v.
Italian Colors,243 involving a family-owned restaurant alleging that
American Express had violated federal antitrust laws. The Court
ruled that even though the expenses that Italian Colors would have to
incur to pursue its claim were likely to be more than the sums it
sought to recoup, that economic disparity did not constitute a basis
for the federal courts to decline to enforce a ban on class actions.244
These two U.S. Supreme Court decisions on accessibility
involved efforts by individuals to enforce their federal statutory
rights. In the 2011 AT&T case, a consumer sought recoupment of
about thirty dollars based on a claim of deceptive advertising under
California law; the filing fee to pursue arbitration was many times
that amount. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the FAA
preempted California’s protection of consumers that would have
permitted less well-resourced claimants to bring collective actions.245
State law may, nonetheless, have some means of insisting on
affordability in individual cases, either by applying the Green Tree
test or through finding fee obligations to be unconscionable.
California, for example, requires that if employees allege violations of
state statutory rights and if employers require arbitration, an
employer is required to pay all costs “unique to arbitration.”246 In
addition, California requires that consumer arbitration providers
waive their administrative charges for “indigent consumers,” defined
as those with incomes of “less than 300 percent of the federal poverty
guidelines.”247 This provision does not apply to arbitrators’ own fees,
but to costs imposed by the entities that administer arbitration.
California instructs providers to give consumers notice of this option
243. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
244. Id. at 2310–11; see Brian Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV.
161, 172–73 (2015).
245. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011).
246. See Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal.
2000); Hovanesyan v. Glendale Internal Med. & Cardiology Med. Grp., No. B277855, 2017
WL 2391688, at *7–9 (Cal. Ct App. June 2, 2017). The court in Hovanesyan analyzed a
rule by JAMS that put the right to recovery “at risk” if a plaintiff did not pay its share of
arbitration costs. 2017 WL 2391688, at *8–9; see also Penilla v. Westmont Corp., 207 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 473, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). Ambitions to do more to support individuals come
from model state consumer and employee laws, proposed by consumer advocates. See
MODEL STATE CONSUMER & EMP. JUSTICE ENF’T ACT tit. IV § 2(e) (DAVID
SELIGMAN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR. 2015).
247. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.);
see also Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 353 P.3d 741, 755 (Cal. 2015) (“In
enacting Code of Civil Procedure section 1284.3, the Legislature concluded that an
ability-to-pay approach is appropriate in the context of consumer arbitration
agreements.”).

96 N.C. L. REV. 605 (2018)

660

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

and to create forms for sworn declarations that a particular consumer
qualifies; providers are not to ask for additional information.248
In compliance, the AAA provides a “Waiver of Fees Notice for
Use by California Consumers Only” on its website.249 Another
document (not available on the web) applies to the rest of the country
and has the title “Affidavit in Support of Reduction or Deferral of
Filing and Administrative Fees.”250 The latter form requires
consumers outside of California to make detailed disclosures of
assets, income, and liabilities and does not indicate the availability of
full fee waivers.251 AAA staff report that waivers have been provided
when requests are made, but that the AAA does not track the
numbers or kinds of waivers, deductions, or deferrals given.252 Thus,
robust and publicly accessible analogues to court-based in forma
pauperis proceedings are not available in arbitration.
Turning then to courts, the obligation to waive fees generally
stems from statutes, pegged to poverty.253 As I discussed in Part II, in
the early 1970s, constitutional law came into play. The U.S. Supreme
Court mandated fee waivers for the class of plaintiffs seeking divorces
in Connecticut, which lacked a statute providing for such an
exemption.254 As I also noted, the U.S. tests for eligibility are narrow,
while courts in Canada and the U.K have required fee waivers

248. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(b)(3) (Westlaw).
249. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AFFIDAVIT FOR WAIVER OF FEES NOTICE FOR USE
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/AAA
BY CALIFORNIA CONSUMERS ONLY,
%20Affidavit%20for%20Waiver%20of%20Fees%20Notice%20California%20Consumers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7WQU-SKWE].
250. Affidavit in Support of Reduction or Deferral of Filing and Administrative Fees,
Am. Arbitration Ass’n (on file with author).
251. Id.
252. The information came from an exchange of emails and telephone interviews with
Ryan Boyle, AAA’s Vice President for Statistics and In-House Research. See Sept. 2017
Email from Ryan Boyle, supra note 206; Email from Ryan Boyle, Vice President, Statistics
& In-House Research, Am. Arbitration Ass’n, to Judith Resnik (Oct. 25, 2017) (on file
with author); Telephone Interviews with Ryan Boyle, Vice President, Statistics & InHouse Research, Am. Arbitration Ass’n (Feb. 2015, Apr. 2015, Aug. 2017, Sept. 2017, Jan.
25, 2018).
253. See, e.g., C.S. v. W.O., 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 343–44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). A trial
court had held that because a recipient of public benefits had received a $1,000 gift to pay
for an expedited transcript on an appeal in a child custody dispute, she was not eligible to
have a fee waiver. Id. at 340. The appellate court reversed, citing both the constitutional
mandates of due process and equal protection and the California statute providing fee
waivers if persons received public benefits, and that, once granted, the waivers continued
in all stages of the proceedings. Id. at 342–44.
254. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–82 (1970); supra text accompanying
notes 48–52.
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through showings of economic hardship expressly limited to
indigency.255
No national database of which I am aware tracks the numbers of
individuals who seek to file without prepayment of court fees or who
ask for waivers at subsequent proceedings. One recent study, about
how low-income litigants “plead poverty” in the federal courts, found
that the test for waiving filing fees varies by jurisdiction and, within
the federal system, by district court and sometimes by district judge.256
A possible proxy for information on fee waivers comes from
research on litigants who are self-represented and sometimes labeled
“pro se.” My opening discussion noted that about a quarter of the
civil filings in the federal courts are brought by individuals lacking
lawyers,257 that rates of appeals without lawyers run in excess of fifty
percent,258 and that research on state courts identified a set of about
650,000 civil cases in which at least one side in three-quarters of the
cases had no lawyer.259 Most often, that party was the defendant.260
In addition to filing fees, courts impose many other charges.
Illinois’s 2016 Task Force identified “a tremendous growth in the
assessments imposed on the parties to court proceedings.” Both civil
plaintiffs and defendants are “required to pay hundreds of dollars” to
pursue or to defend claims.261 In that state, the fees vary by county,262
which can include local add-ons to support facilities, such as children’s
waiting rooms and libraries.263 An overview comes from Figure 2,

255. See R (on application of UNISON) v. Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51, [117]
(Lord Reed) (appeal taken from Eng.); see also supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
256. See Andrew Hammond, Pleading Poverty in Federal Court 3 (Feb. 2018)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
257. See 2016 U.S. DISTRICT COURTS PRO SE FILINGS, supra note 5; 2005–2010 U.S.
DISTRICT COURT PRO SE FILINGS, supra note 5. The federal district court database
details unrepresented litigants (termed “pro se filings”) back to 2005.
258. See U.S. APPELLATE COURT PRO SE FILINGS, supra note 6.
259. LANDSCAPE CIVIL LITIGATION STATE COURTS 2015, supra note 7, at 31–32.
260. Id. at iv. In 1992, attorneys had represented both parties in ninety-five percent of
the cases; in 2012 to 2013, in twenty-four percent of the cases. See id. at 31.
261. ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 1.
262. Id. at 10.
263. For example, the filing fee in one county was $267. See MCLEAN CTY. CIRCUIT
CLERK, MCLEAN CTY. LAW & JUSTICE CTR., CIVIL FEE FILING SCHEDULE 3 (2017),
http://www.mcleancountyil.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/2751 [https://perma.cc/N6HKHDUG]. This schedule lists what look like additional fees for arbitration; for example of
claims seeking $10,000 to $15,000, it appears that an additional fee of $182 is imposed. Id.
In McHenry County, arbitration filing fees range from $167 to $252. MCHENRY CTY.
CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT, FEE SCHEDULE 1 (2017), https://www.co.mchenry.il.us
/home/showdocument?id=71476 [https://perma.cc/P6C8-CAKH]. Additionally, Illinois
charges a party who declines the non-binding outcome of court-annexed arbitration a
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Civil Court Assessments in Illinois, which is reproduced from the
Task Force Report, and sets forth the ingredients of what it called a
“recipe” of fees stemming from different sources. Notable is the
imposition of the fee charged to civil defendants; unless qualifying for
fee waivers, defendants have to pay between $15 and $110 to answer
claims brought against them.

Figure 2264

“rejection fee” of $200 for awards less than $30,000, and $500for awards greater than
$30,000, unless the party is indigent. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 93.
264. ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 10.
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“Hundreds of dollars” in fees is apt not only for Illinois, but also
for many other states. San Diego County charges $435 for child
support filings if a child support agency does not intervene and $700
for the adoption of a stepchild.265 Moreover, although some states
provide that waivers must be accorded for all stages of proceedings,
litigants may need to renew applications to obtain waivers.266 Like
Illinois, California imposes charges on defendants to respond to
claims. The amounts for both plaintiffs and defendants vary with the
value of the claim and for some cases, such as those seeking
protective orders, no fees are charged. In small claims court
(involving $10,000 or less), filing fees for plaintiffs range from thirty
to seventy-five dollars.267 Figure 3 provides a sampling of some of the
fees charged as of 2017 in five major states, California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Washington, which had in total almost 100
million residents, or about thirty percent of the U.S. population in
2016.268

265. Family Law Fees, SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF SAN DIEGO,
http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/portal/page?_pageid=55,1524419&_dad=portal&_schema=POR
TAL [https://perma.cc/5PNG-XFFQ]. In Los Angeles County, it costs $435 to file for child
support if a child support agency does not intervene and $424 for the child interview
portion of child custody evaluation. SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF LOS ANGELES,
CIVIL FEE SCHEDULE 4, (July 1, 2016), http://www.lacourt.org/forms/pdf/fees/feeschedule-2016_rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GBM-ACWH].
266. An example comes from Kim v. De Maria, 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 849 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. 2013). There, the court concluded that, given that a defendant received public
benefits, he was “entitled to have all fees waived including jury fees and expenses.” Id. at
852 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68632).
267. See SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., STATEWIDE CIVIL FEE SCHEDULE 5–6 (2017),
http://www.fresno.courts.ca.gov/fees_schedule/documents/Statewide%20Civil%20Fee%20
Schedule%20January%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/PB4L-NU3K]. The amount for filing
the “first paper” in cases involving more than $25,000 is $435, and in claims involving
$10,000-$25,000, the amount is $370. Id. at 1.
268. See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/2ZZH-HYGU].
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Figure 3
My focus is on how cost barriers suppress information in civil
litigation, but mention needs to be made of fees imposed on criminal
defendants.269 Illustrative are “registration fees” for indigent
defendants entitled to legal counsel. Los Angeles County charged
fifty dollars to defendants being assigned a “free” lawyer and, in 2016,
had garnered about $300,000 from those fees. In the summer of 2017,
the county was persuaded to remove the fee.270 “Services”—such as
269. See generally ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS
PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016). See also MARIE CLAIRE TRAN-LEUNG, SHRIVER
CTR., DEBT ARISING FROM ILLINOIS’ CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MAKING SENSE OF
THE
AD HOC ACCUMULATION OF FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS 1 (2009),
http://povertylaw.org/files/docs/debt-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPN9-P32C] (“When a
person enters the criminal justice system, a complicated, ad hoc system of financial
obligations awaits.”).
270. See DEVON PORTER, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., PAYING FOR
JUSTICE: THE HUMAN COST OF PUBLIC DEFENDER FEES 2 (2017), https://www.aclusocal.org
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drug courts, probation, and ankle bracelet monitoring—are also the
bases for yet more assessments, and failure to pay can result in threats
of imprisonment. Fines impose yet other costs, illustrated by litigation
against Virginia’s practice of automatically suspending driver’s
licenses when tickets were not paid.271
Many lawsuits (sometimes brought as class actions) challenge the
cascading wave of fees, fines, assessments, and surcharges. The result
is that courts have become venues for conflicts about their own costs.
Both state and federal judges are returning to the questions raised in
1971 in Boddie v. Connecticut about how commitments to “open
courts,” due process, equal protection, and prohibitions on excessive
fines affect fees charged by courts. For example, a 2013 ruling by the
Supreme Court of Washington held that its constitution required that
a “surcharge” added to deal with budget shortfalls had to be waived
once a person was found to qualify for a filing fee waiver.272
Challenges based on unconstitutional conflicts of interest have also
been raised because some of the fees generated are returned to the
entities imposing them.273 One federal district court concluded that
due process obligations of impartiality were violated because the
judges deciding on fee waivers benefitted from the fees recouped.274
I have discussed the financial obligations produced by the court
system, but the costs of courts have to be understood in broader
terms, including the economic impact of the lack of access and of the
time to reach decisions. The issue of disposition time was the focus of
a recent study, prompted by the major cutbacks in the budget of the
/sites/default/files/pdfees-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AG6-3MTA]; Nina Agrawal, L.A.
County Ends Public Defender ‘Registration Fee’, L.A. TIMES (June 6, 2017),
http://beta.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-registration-fee-20170606-story.html [https://perma.cc
/C2FG-DB5Y].
271. See Stinnie v. Holcomb, No. 3:16-cv-00044, 2017 WL 963234, at *3–4 (W.D. Va.
Mar. 13, 2017), appeal docketed, No. 17-1740 (4th Cir.). Members of the plaintiff class in
Stinnie had their driver’s licenses revoked after being “convicted of some traffic violation
or crime, thus incurring court costs, fees, and fines they could not afford to pay.” Id. at *4.
According to the district court, “hundreds of thousands of Virginians allegedly have had
their licenses suspended for failure to pay court costs and fines.” Id. at *3.
272. Jafar v. Webb, 303 P.3d 1042, 1043 (Wash. 2013).
273. See, e.g., Cain v. City of New Orleans, No. 15-4479, 2017 WL 6372836, at *21–22
(E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2017); Kevin McGill, 'Mayor's Court' Taken to Federal Court in
Louisiana, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/louisiana
/articles/2017-12-06/mayors-court-taken-to-federal-court-in-louisiana.
274. Cain, 2017 WL 6372836, at *26. The court discussed Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927), in which money raised by fines levied “was divided between the state, the village
general fund, and two other village funds.” Cain, 2017 WL 6372836, at *22. As in that
famous Prohibition-era case, the district court in Cain concluded that the judges’ “direct
pecuniary interest in the outcome” created financial motives to convict. Id. at *22, *25
(quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535).
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California judiciary. Researchers sought to measure the direct and
indirect losses in the wake of the decrease in funding275 and put the
loss of some 150,000 jobs and $30 billion in what it termed “economic
output.”276 Looking at time-to-disposition in federal courts and in
arbitration, the report praised arbitration for producing faster
dispositions.277 What the Report did not, however, explore is how the
vastly larger number of civil cases—217,288—filed in federal district
courts in 2015, as compared to 1,375 cases in the AAA caseload,
affected the analysis. Nor did the report factor in the “missing cases”
that could have been pursued individually or as collective actions in
court.
Figures 2 and 3 provide glimpses of the dollars assessed in courts.
The published schedules of fees have become the bases for lawsuits
and for court-authorized task forces seeking to make changes. Given
the Supreme Court’s enforcement of privately-imposed class action
bars, no pending cases of which I am aware contest the structure and
the costs of arbitration processes. Closed processes not only limit
access to claiming and suppress information on the cases filed, but
also cut off debates on and challenges to the costs of the processes by
which disputes are resolved.
C.

Losing Adjudication

Remarkably few cases actually involve much litigation. The
National Center on State Court’s research on state court dispositions
evaluated almost a million cases dealt with between 2012 and 2013.278
Most of the civil cases involved debt collection, in which most debtordefendants were not represented, and almost all of the decisions took
place without adjudication (defined to include court-annexed
arbitration) on the merits.279 Specifically, about two-thirds of the

275. ROY WEINSTEIN, CULLEN EDES, JOE HALE & NELS PEARSALL, MICRONOMICS,
EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH
ARBITRATION COMPARED WITH U.S. DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 2 (2017),
http://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/Economic%20Impact%20of%20Delay%20Micronomics
%20Final%20Report%20%282017-03-07%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL77-2JYQ].
276. Id.
277. Id. at 2–3. The numbers of cases for arbitration came from the AAA and involved
7,416 cases. Id. at 32 n.47. Of the cases that went to award, 637 (8.6%) were consumer
cases. Id.; see also supra Figure 1.
278. LANDSCAPE CIVIL LITIGATION STATE COURTS 2015, supra note 7, at iii.
279. Id. at iii, 20, 31. The data on other forms of dispositions are what social scientists
call “noisy,” in that about a quarter have an “unspecified” judgment and the grounds for
neither the thirty-five percent dismissed nor the ten percent settled were specified in court
documents. Id. at 20.
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filings involved contract claims; more than one half of that set of
claims were landlord-tenant and debt collection.
Those numbers reflect a change in the kinds of cases coming to
court and in the modes of disposition. Twenty years ago, in a parallel
study, the NCSC found that about half of the claims analyzed were
tort cases;280 the NCSC’s 2012-2013 data put tort cases down to seven
percent.281 In about three-quarters of the more recent judgments
analyzed, the sums were under $5,200, and the study reported that
overall, four percent of the filings were disposed of by trials. 282
In federal court, the statistic that has become familiar is that onein-one-hundred civil cases starts a trial. The shorthand is the
“vanishing trial.” Opportunities for the public to watch proceedings
other than trial are also diminishing, as recorded in research on
“bench presence,” counting the hours that federal judges spend in
open court, whether on trial or not. The study reported a “steady
year-over-year decline in total courtroom hours” from 2008 to 2012
that continued into 2013.283 Judges spent less than two hours a day on
average in the courtroom, or about “423 hours of open court
proceedings per active district judge.”284
What about decision-making in mandated arbitration? In Section
IV.A, I provided a snapshot of claims resolved during eight years that
involved one company and were administered by the AAA. But recall
that, as of 2017, of more than thirty institutions running consumer
280. The 1992 data were drawn from case outcomes in the seventy-five “most populous
counties” in the country. Id. at 7. Of about 762,000 tort, contract, and property
dispositions, approximately 378,000 were tort cases. See CAROL J. DEFRANCES, JOHN A.
GOERDT, PATRICK A. LANGAN & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: TORT CASES
IN LARGE COUNTIES 6 (1995), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/TCILC.PDF
[https://perma.cc/D9T3-MUYA]; see also CAROL J. DEFRANCES, STEVEN K. SMITH,
PATRICK A. LANGAN, BRIAN J. OSTROM, DAVID B. ROTTMAN & JOHN A. GOERDTY,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF
STATE COURTS, 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 1 (1995),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf [https://perma.cc/U336-2XGU].
281. LANDSCAPE CIVIL LITIGATION STATE COURT 2015, supra note 7, at iv.
282. Id. Adjudication was defined for these purposes as trials by a judge or jury,
summary judgment, and binding arbitration. In the 1992 survey, 62% of the cases were
disposed of through settlements, and 3% were disposed of by judge or jury trial. Id. at 7.
Thus, in the 2012-2013 data, of the almost one million cases, 32,124 trials took place, of
which 1109 (3%) were jury trials, and 31,015 (97%) were bench trials. Id. at 25. Jury
awards exceeded $500,000 in 17 (3%) of the cases, and 75% of the jury awards in tort
cases were below $152,000. Id. at 28. The 2012-2013 study also noted that, as contrasted
with 1992, both parties were represented in 24% of the bench trials. Id. at 28.
283. Jordan M. Singer & Hon. William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated
Look at Federal District Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565, 565 (2014).
284. Id. at 566.
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arbitrations in California, about one-third file the data as the state
statute directs. Moreover, the statute calls for five years of data, and
each time the AAA puts up a new three-month interval, it has
developed a practice of taking down earlier intervals of data.
Therefore, unless researchers independently stockpile data and until
many other providers comply, no comprehensive account is available
about the patterns of arbitration’s use over time.
V. THE “LOGICS” AND THE “EXPERIENCES” OF COURTS
AND OF ARBITRATION
Judges’ experiences with growing numbers of poor people in
court are part of what prompts states to convene A2J task forces to
find new routes for the funding of litigants and courts.285 In some
instances, state judiciaries have succeeded in obtaining new streams
of funding to provide legal services for cases involving housing and
families. New York, for example, under the leadership of former
Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman, set aside $100 million for civil legal
services in 2017.286 Illinois’s Task Force aims to alter its filing fee
system.287 Connecticut’s Task Force has proposed a statutory right to
civil counsel for domestic violence, child custody, and eviction cases,
as well as fee-shifting in foreclosure and debt collection cases.288 If the
political will is available, some of the problems can be mitigated.
Indeed, given that courts’ budgets are typically a small percentage
(two to three percent) of state and federal expenditures, public
insistence on funding could do more.
Other restructuring can come from regulations of ADR/ODR
and arbitration as well as from the development of constitutional
doctrine, which could be put to work to retrieve public access to
dispute resolution. I have already noted constitutional challenges to
285. See CIVIL JUSTICE IMPROVEMENTS COMM., CALL TO ACTION: ACHIEVING
CIVIL JUSTICE FOR ALL: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES
4–6 (2016), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/microsites/files/civil-justice/ncsc-cji-report-web.ashx
[https://perma.cc/3JJL-S2D4].
286. JONATHAN LIPPMAN, LAWRENCE K. MARKS, RONALD P. YOUNKINS, BARRY R.
CLARKE & MAUREEN H. MCALARY, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., FISCAL YEAR
2016-2017 BUDGET (2017), https://www.nycourts.gov/admin/financialops/BGT16-17/201617-UCS-Budget.pdf [https://perma.cc/X38Y-D43M].
287. See ILLINOIS COURT ASSESSMENTS 2016, supra note 19, at 38–39, app. A
(Proposed Court Clerk Assessment Act, 705 ILCS 105/27.1); see also 705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 105/27.1a (West, Westlaw through Pub. Acts effective Jan. 1, 2018).
288. WILLIAM H. CLENDENEN, JR. & TIMOTHY FISHER, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY,
JUDICIARY COMM., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO LEGAL
COUNSEL IN CIVIL MATTERS (2016), http://www.rc.com/upload/O-Hanlan-Final-Reportof-CT-Leg-Task-Force-12_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YS9-ZMBF].
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fines, fees, surcharges, bail, and the structure of financial obligations
stemming from courts. Here, I focus both on regulations and on the
mandates for public access to court proceedings, which are predicated
on a mix of common, statutory, and constitutional law.
One method for interrupting privatization can be regulatory, as
illustrated by British Columbia289 and, in the United States, by the
CFPB’s efforts in 2016 and 2017. In addition to proposing that predispute class action waivers not go into effect in the financial products
and services markets over which it had jurisdiction, the CFPB also
sought to require reporting on arbitration—through databasing on a
website, with redactions if needed for individuals’ privacy.290 That
rule, which shared some of the features of California and other states’
mandates on reporting, required information on the initial claim
requested,
the
documents
mandating
arbitration,
and
communications between individual arbitrators and the administrator
(such as the AAA) related to problems if the service provider had not
paid required fees.291 But such efforts were stymied in October of
2017 when Congress (with the Vice President voting in the Senate)
passed a resolution providing that the CFPB’s proposed “rule shall
have no force or effect.”292
Other U.S. regulatory systems do impose obligations for
arbitration providers to make some information public. The Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) requires public disclosure
of awards,293 as does the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (“ICANN”), a non-profit that created a dispute
resolution system for disagreements about domain names; ICANN
289. See supra notes 132-138.
290. See Arbitration Agreements, 81 Fed. Reg. 32,830, 32,838, 32,868 (proposed May
24, 2016) (to have been codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040).
291. See id. The proposal is analyzed in Nancy A. Welsh, Dispute Resolution Neutrals’
Ethical Obligation to Support Reasonable Transparency (Nov. 14, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). As she details, the proposal garnered “strong support”
from the American Bar Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution. Id. at 7–9; see also
Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Dispute Resolutions, Comment Letter on the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection Proposed Rule on Arbitration Agreements (July 29, 2016)
[hereinafter
ABA
Dispute
Resolution
Section
2016
Comments],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/dispute_resolution/bars/dr-cfpb
-comments_7-29-16.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/KD79-V5FT].
292. See Joint Resolution Providing for Congressional Disapproval under Chapter 8 of
Title 5, United States Code, of the Rule Submitted by Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection Relating to “Arbitration Agreements,” Pub. L. No. 115-74, 131 Stat. 1243 (Nov.
1, 2017).
293. See Welsh, supra note 291, at 13; Rule 12904(h): Awards, FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4192 [https://perma.cc
/LUG5-DMF8].
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publishes arbitrators’ decisions.294 Moreover, as the analysis of the
AAA filings reflects, state statutes can also force information about
arbitration into the open.
Another question is what work constitutional mandates could
play in making public the processes of and the decisions in dispute
resolution. As I sketch below, the current case law offers doctrinal
access; interpretations of the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, coupled with Article III’s creation of an independent
judiciary, make impermissible the closing off of trials and related
court proceedings. What the doctrine does not (yet) do is to take into
account changing procedures in and out of court and insist on
functional openness. Hence, a few details about the limits and
possibilities of the current law are in order.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that criminal trials and related
activities, including voir dire and pre-trial suppression hearings, are to
be open, absent case-specific reasons that permit narrowly tailored
closings of a particular proceeding.295 The Court’s strong stance bent
some in 2017 when it declined to find that a routine practice in
Massachusetts of closing courtrooms during voir dire constituted a
structural error requiring enforcement by vacating a conviction.296
The Court has not directly addressed the public’s right to observe
civil litigation, but lower courts have read the precedents, coupled
with common law, to require access to civil litigation analogous to
that accorded in criminal litigation. The Court’s approach, predicated
294. See Rule 16(b) of Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy,
ICANN, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en [https://perma.cc
/D27B-FDK7]; Welsh, supra note 291, at 14.
295. See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 209 (2010); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39,
40, 45 (1984); see also Simonson, supra note 101, at 2195–96 (analyzing the uneven
application of these rulings in the lower courts).
296. See Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1910 (2017) (“[W]hile the publictrial right is important for fundamental reasons, in some cases an unlawful closure might
take place and yet the trial still will be fundamentally fair from the defendant’s
standpoint.”). Thus, the standard of review varied depending on whether the claim was
raised “on direct review or raised instead in a claim alleging ineffective assistance of
counsel.” Id. at 1912. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that Weaver’s
attorney did not object to court room closure because he “did not understand that the
public had a right to be present during the jury empanelment phase of the trial
proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Weaver, 54 N.E.3d 495, 520 (Mass. 2016). As Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, explained in his Weaver dissent, the Court had
recognized that “the benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult to prove,
or a matter of chance.” Weaver, 137 S. Ct. at 1917 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Waller,
467 U.S. at 49). As a result, “a requirement that prejudice be shown ‘would in most cases
deprive [the defendant] of the [public-trial] guarantee, for it would be difficult to envisage
a case in which he would have evidence available of specific injury.’” Id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9) (alteration in original)).
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on the First Amendment, relies on historical experiences of courts as
public venues and the values of the resulting public exchanges. The
normative argument reflects (albeit not always with citations)
Bentham’s concerns about education, oversight, and accountability.297
Judges describe the analysis as considering the “experience” of
practices over time to ascertain whether a “tradition of accessibility”
has existed for a kind of proceeding. Judges then assess the “logic,”
which entails the claimed benefits of openness or closure through
evaluating whether “access plays a significant positive role in the
functioning of the particular process in question.”298 The doctrine
does not provide clear direction about the vantage point (litigants,
courts, the public, or social welfare more generally) from which to
make that assessment. Should the perspective be that of litigants or
judges eager for closure, or of third parties such as those participating
in #MeToo and complaining about how insistence on secrecy stymied
their claims?
Despite the fuzziness, courts using this test have found
constitutional access rights to civil trials and to related court-based
proceedings. As in criminal cases, openness can be tempered under
U.S. law, as it was for Bentham.299 If a proceeding does qualify as

297. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1986); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1980) (plurality opinion); see also BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 31.
298. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986). This test was developed from
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, joined by Justice
Marshall, Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584–89, and has been applied in civil cases,
see, for example, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013);
N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 297–99 (2d Cir. 2012); and
Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984).
299. Bentham’s enthusiasm for openness did not render him insensitive to the burdens
of public processes and the need for privacy. His justifications for privacy included
protecting participants from “annoyance,” avoiding unnecessary harm to individuals
through “disclosure of facts prejudicial to their honour” or about their “pecuniary
circumstances,” and preserving both “public decency” and state secrets. BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, supra note 31, at 360. Specifically, exceptions
permitted expelling those who disturbed a proceeding and closing proceedings for the
preservation of “peace and good order,” to “protect the judge, the parties, and all other
persons present, against annoyance,” to “preserve the tranquility and reputation of
individuals and families from unnecessary vexation by disclosure of facts prejudicial to
their honour, or liable to be productive of uneasiness or disagreements among
themselves,” to avoid “unnecessary disclosure of . . . pecuniary circumstances,” “to
preserve public decency from violation” and to protect “secrets of state.” Id. Bentham’s
list of circumstances for closure, like his arguments for openness, parallel those made in
contemporary courts. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights provides
that:
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open, the next decision is whether special considerations justify a
narrowly tailored closure.
A related line of cases focuses specifically on public access to
documents filed in court.300 The case law, mixing common law
traditions and constitutional values, requires access to “judicial
documents” that are “relevant to the performance of the judicial
function and useful in the judicial process.”301 Judges describe a
“strong presumption in favor of openness” if records are filed in
court,302 with the burden of closure falling to the party seeking to do
so,303 again coupled with admonitions to tailor narrowly any sealing.304
If this body of law can help to make non-trial-based ADR and
ODR open to third parties, more analyses are needed about what
constitutes “judicial documents” and whether the concept of “judicial
documents” applies when “judges” are ADR providers, such as courtannexed arbitrations. Aspects of these questions have been explored.
For example, judges have debated whether materials attached to
motions or reports from post-settlement monitors or by government
agencies fall within the mandated accessibility.305 In litigation related
to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the question was whether
a settlement involving property claims against airline insurers would
be made publicly available.306 The New York Times succeeded in

Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national
security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection
of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 6, § 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. Examples of debates about closure in the
context of national security can be found in Botmeh v. United Kingdom, App. No.
15187/03, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. 659, 662–67 (2008).
300. See, e.g., Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93–96 (2d Cir. 2004).
301. See United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1995).
302. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983);
see also Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 92, 96.
303. In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194 (3d Cir. 2001). The burden is a heavy one:
“Only the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.” In re
Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983).
304. See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002); see also
Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305–06 (6th Cir. 2016);
JetAway Aviation, LLC v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 754 F.3d 824, 826–27 (10th Cir. 2014).
305. See, e.g., United States v. Erie Cty., 763 F.3d 235, 239–41 (2d Cir. 2014); SEC v.
Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d 1, 3–5 (D.C. Cir. 2013); IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1223–
25 (8th Cir. 2013).
306. See In re Sept. 11 Lit., 723 F. Supp. 2d 526, 529–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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having a court grant its request to unseal the aggregate amounts of
the settlement and the allocation of funds from contributing insurers
but not information on amounts paid to settling defendants.307
Another case involved reports by a court-appointed monitor in a case
relating to conditions at a county jail; the Second Circuit held those
materials had to be publicly accessible.308 And in 2017, the D.C.
Circuit rejected the redaction of materials that had been sealed below
but which were relevant to a pending appeal.309
What the cases do not yet address are other activities that have
become part of the “judicial function,” including managing and
settling cases. Could regulations require or lawsuits force access to
materials related to settlement efforts or require that the interactions
among disputants and judges be held in open court and on the
record? Return to the two doctrinal prongs of “experience” and
“logic.” As noted, a few jurists report doing their Rule 16 conferences
on the bench, yet no rules oblige doing so. As for the “logic,” the
issue would be whether openness plays a “significant positive role.” If
court-annexed arbitration, for example, is open, then experiences of it
can be used to confirm the vitality of public access. But if
confidentiality becomes the norm, one could rely on that experience
as the basis for overruling challenges to closed procedures.310 The
Court’s test thus invites troubling circularity, as practices in place turn
what “is” into what ought to be.
Another issue is who counts as a “judge.” Court-based
arbitrators are, under federal statutes, accorded judge-like immunity

307. Id. at 533.
308. Erie Cty., 763 F.3d at 241.
309. Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 667–69 (D.C. Cir.
2017). The company had challenged the decision by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council that had designated it under the Dodd–Frank Act to be a “nonbank financial
company,” which subjected it to more supervision by Federal Reserve System’s Board of
Governors. Id. at 663. A group called “Better Markets” sought to intervene to unseal the
briefs and appendices related to summary judgment. Id. at 664. The trial court permitted
intervention but rejected the motion to unseal; the appellate court held that the materials
were “judicial records” and that the Dodd–Frank Act did not limit the common law right
of public access. Id. at 664–69. The circuit court distinguished its decision in SEC v.
American International Group, which had concluded that “an independent consultant’s
reports were not judicial records.” Id. at 667–68. The circuit court in that case held that,
although prepared because of a consent decree, the materials were not therefore given to
the district court. Am. Int’l Grp., 712 F.3d at 3–5. In Metlife, in contrast, the court
concluded that the relevant materials were before the district court and that redaction was
not proper, even if some of the materials had been sealed below. 865 F.3d at 675–76.
310. Illustrative of that approach is the dissent in Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v.
Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 523–26 (3d Cir. 2013) (Roth, J., dissenting).
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and constrained by judicial rules of disqualification.311 Yet while
shielded from liability, they are not currently obliged to do their work
in public or to report their decisions to the public. Were the work of
court-based arbitrators to come within the “judicial function/judicial
process” rubric, then materials provided in ADR could be made
available and routinely data based, with caveats akin to the rules in
British Columbia, would be to impose limits, such as to protect
disclosures until after the decisions become final or new trials are
held, or for personal privacy and other specified reasons for limiting
access.
A more ambitious doctrinal innovation would be to understand
that, given that mandates to participate in arbitration come from nonnegotiable obligations that courts have enforced through the FAA,312
the resulting “private” arbitrations are artifacts of public law, subject
to regulation. Instead of arguing that mandated arbitration constitutes
an unconstitutional delegation of federal judges’ Article III powers,313
one could condition constitutionality on having the attributes of
adjudication—openness, due process norms of impartiality and
evenhandedness, and equal protection—travel with the delegation.
Support for this equation of arbitration and adjudication comes
from a debate in Nebraska about the constitutionality of arbitration
itself. In 1889 and again in 1991, the Nebraska Supreme Court read
the state constitution as prohibiting mandated arbitration because the
closed processes were inconsistent with its “open courts”/”rights-toremedies” clauses.314 In response to the 1991 decision, lobbyists for
arbitration succeeded in getting an amendment to the state’s
constitution to license closed arbitrations as an exception to the opencourts clause.315 But another argument remains—that because
arbitration has become a licit substitute for court, it ought to be
required, inter alia, to offer third parties opportunities to watch how it
works.
To summarize, if courts are to be sustained as open venues and if
court-like activities are to become open, more than the current
formulations are needed.316 Doing so will require weaning the

311. 28 U.S.C. § 655(b)–(c) (2012).
312. See Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 1, at 2860–63, 2870–74.
313. See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 15–53 (2013).
314. See State v. Neb. Ass’n of Pub. Emps., 477 N.W.2d 577, 581–82 (Neb. 1991);
German-Am. Ins. Co. v. Etherton, 41 N.W. 406, 406 (Neb. 1889).
315. Details of the political campaign for the amendment are provided in Resnik,
Constitutional Entitlements, supra note 65, at 983–85.
316. See Resnik, Public Dimension, supra note 77, at 408–20, 423–27.
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doctrine from its focus on “experiences,” which are increasingly of
private activities, and insisting on expanded analyses of the “logic”
supporting public processes. Moreover, the doctrine could rest on a
mix of due process, equal protection, Article III, and First
Amendment values to require both public access to, and collective
actions in, courts and arbitration.
The doctrinal presumption of open courts would apply to the
surrogates for courts, as would the mandate to tailor narrow limits on
third-party access. Parties and the decision-makers would have the
burden of justifying why to shut the doors in particular cases, such as
by relying on arguments familiar in courts and predicated on
commercial interests in trade secrets or on personal safety and
privacy. The result would be that, in contrast to current secrecy
practices, most consumer and many employment arbitrations would
have to be open. The enforceability of both the obligation to arbitrate
and of the results could be conditioned on the provision of public
access rights.
VI. THE INTERESTS AT STAKE
Doctrine is not free-floating. Law is nested in political and social
movements. The pressures to close off courts reflect efforts by
contemporary political leaders, promising to diminish the provision of
government services more generally. The conflicts over secrecy and
openness in courts is part of a larger backlash against what I have
elsewhere termed “statization”—the expansion during the twentieth
century of government activities that aimed, in some measure, to be
redistributive and egalitarian.317 My efforts here, to reconstitute
predicates for open courts, goes against these deregulatory
privatization efforts.
To succeed entails a politics supportive of openness. Norms of
egalitarian redistribution can be one route. In the current climate so
accepting of inequalities, another entails clarifying that the problems
posed by closed courts and diffuse dispute resolution are not
identified as detrimental to low-income litigants alone. How can

317. See Judith Resnik, Globalization(s), Privatization(s), Constitutionalization, and
Statization: Icons and Experiences of Sovereignty in the 21st Century, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L.
162, 168–73 (2013); Judith Resnik, Courts and Economic and Social Rights/Courts as
Economic and Social Rights, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS,
(Katharine G. Young ed., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2–4) https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2983853 [https://perma.cc/BJR3-A8RS]; see also Martha T.
McCluskey, Constitutional Economic Justice: Structural Power for “We the People,” 35
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 283–92 (2016).
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repeat players be persuaded to see their interests furthered by
openness? Evidence that some repeat players see the value of
openness and its relationship to legitimacy comes from inside the
market of dispute resolution providers. Examples include recent
changes in investor-state dispute resolution under the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), which
created “Transparency Rules” in 2013 for a subset of arbitrations and
that requires (when the rules apply) disclosure of a wide range of
information submitted to and issued by tribunals.318
In the United States, a parallel call came both from the CFPB
and, in the summer of 2016 from the ABA’s Dispute Resolution
Section, which applauded the CFPB rule that would have mandated
more disclosure in financial services arbitrations. That Section,
comprised of lawyers committed to ADR, argued that transparency
was particularly important to help “protect the integrity of arbitration
and, by extension, the integrity of the strong federal policy in favor of
arbitration” upon which the U.S. Supreme Court has insisted.319 The
rule almost went into effect; Congress split in 2017, with half of the
Senate supporting the CFPB regulations mandating openness in
arbitration as well as limits on class action bans. Yet another example
is the 2017 pending legislation to exempt sexual harassment claims
from arbitration; that proposal reflects the impact of the #MeToo
movement, whose participants, pressing for public disclosures, span
the economic and political spectrum.
This set of recent shifts builds on a long tradition of pro-court
efforts by repeat players. Indeed, collective, court-based action has
been deployed in service of a diverse set of claimants. For a period of
time during the second half of the twentieth century, public and
private sector actors understood their interests to be enhanced by
opening up courts, including through class actions and multi-district
litigation, facilitating the pursuit and the closure of claims.320
The pioneering constitutional authorization to do so came at the
behest of banks, seeking to obtain declarations that they had properly
318. See G.A. Res. 68/109, at 1–2 (Dec. 16, 2013); Lise Johnson, The Mauritius
Convention on Transparency: Comments on the Treaty and its Role in Increasing
Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration 1–4 (Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Inv. Policy
Paper, 2014), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/12/10.-Johnson-Mauritius-Convention-onTransparency-Convention.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC7E-LEHY].
319. See ABA Dispute Resolution Section 2016 Comments, supra note 291, at 8;
Welsh, supra note 291, at 7–9.
320. For some of this history, see Resnik, “Vital” State Interests, supra note 11, at 1768–
83 and Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 21–22
(1991).
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discharged their fiduciary obligations to beneficiaries of pooled
trusts.321 In 1950, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Company,322 the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled N.Y. law could constitutionally authorize such
collective accountings and reach beneficiaries nationwide.323 Doing so
required new approaches to the Due Process Clause, governing the
authority of courts to impose binding resolutions. While class actions
have since come to be identified with civil rights, consumers, and
employee plaintiffs, interest in collectivity was then sought to enable
what the U.S. Supreme Court called the “vital state interest” of
marketing pooled trusts that would not subject banks to extensive
challenges for alleged imprudent management.324 The Court’s 1950
caveat was that beneficiaries—across the country—had to be told of
the pendency of the accounting.
That process became the model for the 1966 revisions to the
federal class action rule. And even then, some commentators worried
that enabling collectivity would benefit corporate interests more than
individuals.325 Yet, as it has turned out, class actions became icons of
empowering groups when individuals did not have the “strength” to
pursue their claims alone.326 Mandating notice forced knowledge
about aggregate claims into the public sphere and produced the
debates ongoing today about their fairness and utilities. Although
individuals rarely respond to required notices, notice requirements
put the fact of claiming into the mailboxes of millions and onto the
public screen.
The development of the constitutional law of fee waivers is
likewise predicated on the government’s own need to legitimate court
action. Just as that concern was a part of the calculus for the Court in
Mullane, so too are “vital state interests” reflected in cases requiring
that, as a matter of due process, governments subsidize lawyers for
criminal defendants and help certain kinds of civil litigants327 to
provide some semblance of what the English call “equality of arms”
among disputants. The current wave of constitutional cases,

321. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 307–09 (1950).
322. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
323. See id. at 318–20.
324. Id. at 313.
325. See BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, THE CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 15–17) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
326. See Kaplan, supra note 11, at 497–98; Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due, supra
note 11, at 1043–45.
327. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 119–24 (1996); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963). For the history of that development, see Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers, supra note 52, at 91–93.
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challenging the practice of using courts to generate revenues in ways
that discriminate along race and class lines, again brings the question
of the legitimacy of courts to the fore.
All of us—rich and poor, plaintiff or defendant—need court
systems. Given resource limits and the nature of contemporary harms,
collective actions in courts and finding ways to make the various
forms of ADR public are important facets of legitimacy. To bring
openness back to courts as well as into their alternatives requires a
broad political base. Repeat players (including the federal
government) will need to understand that reviving public courts is in
service of their interests in having thriving economies in which
obligations can be fairly enforced.328 Politics made the law that
opened up courts, and politics will either undo or recommit to dispute
resolution in public.

328. See Resnik, Reorienting the Process Due, supra note 11, at 1065–67; see also Brian
T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing? 15-22 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law School,
Working Paper No. 17-40, 2017); FITZPATRICK, supra note 325 (manuscript at 166–90).

